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If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Na-
poleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." We may say
that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress,
but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers.'
As the United States in the 1980s seeks to reassert its influence abroad,
foreign assistance is playing an increasingly important role in American
foreign policy.2 No longer primarily a subsidy for friendly foreign gov-
ernments, foreign assistance has become a versatile instrument of inter-
vention without the use of force. For example, the United States has
used foreign aid to destabilize unfriendly regimes in Nicaragua, Afghani-
stan, and Angola; to quell international terrorism; and to secure the re-
lease of American hostages in the Middle East. Foreign aid serves an
equally great symbolic role, as a barometer of American moral approval
or disapproval of the outside world.3 Therefore, though the actual vol-
ume of foreign assistance channeled abroad may be small and sometimes
of little impact, American foreign assistance policy functions as a broad
index of U.S. foreign policy concerns. The annual foreign assistance
budgeting process has become no less than a surrogate for a systematic
reexamination of the progress, problems, and propriety of America's for-
eign policy.
4
t J.D. candidate, Yale Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Harold H.
Koh and Maggi McNutt.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2. Outlays for international development and humanitarian assistance increased from $3.6
billion in fiscal year 1980 to $4.4 billion in fiscal year 1987. Outlays for international security
assistance increased over the same period from $4.8 billion to $7.7 billion. OFFICE OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, 1986,
§ 3, table 3.3 (1985); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE U.S. BUDGET IN BRIEF,
1988, at 53-54 (1987).
3. Thus, for example, regarding assistance to the Nicaraguan "contra" rebels, philosophi-
cal divisions over the threat of communism outweigh tactical disagreements over whether the
contras can effectively spend the funds. Similarly, once the sale of arms to Iran became public,
the moral reprehensibility of sending arms to the Ayatollah Khomeini overshadowed assur-
ances by the President that only a planeload of arms had been sent and that the policy had in
fact succeeded in freeing a few hostages.
4. Senator J. William Fulbright observed:
[F]oreign aid provides the closest thing we have to an annual occasion for a general review
of American foreign policy. It provides the opportunity for airing grievances.... It also
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America, however, does not always speak with one voice in foreign
policy and foreign assistance. Historically, the President has promoted
an aggressive foreign policy, and has not hesitated to use the foreign
assistance tool, while Congress has remained skeptical about interna-
tional commitments and the effectiveness of assistance efforts abroad.
The conflict between the White House and Congress on American policy
toward Central America and the Persian Gulf is a current illustration of
this disagreement. Whether it is the President or Congress that "calls
the shots" in foreign assistance is vitally important to the shaping of all
U.S. foreign policy.
This Comment looks at the struggle between the President and Con-
gress over who determines American foreign assistance policy.5 In par-
ticular, it focuses on the "tools" that Congress uses to control executive
discretion in this area. Part I discusses the meaning of "foreign assist-
ance." Part II examines the separation of powers conflict in historical
context, analyzing the evolution of congressional control over executive
action in foreign assistance. It reveals a record of executive evasion of
statutory controls and corresponding congressional constriction of execu-
tive discretion. Against this background, Part III evaluates the constitu-
tional authority of Congress to control foreign assistance. Part IV
examines the effectiveness of congressional controls within limits set by
the Constitution. Finally, Part V considers new devices that Congress
might use to control executive action, and proposes that Congress create
provides the occasion for a discussion of more fundamental questions, pertaining to
America's role in the world, to the areas that fall within and those which exceed its proper
responsibilities.
HEARINGS ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1967), quoted
in Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Power Over Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970
DUKE L.J. 293, 321 n.187.
5. No recent research has examined in depth the historical and constitutional relationship
of the President and Congress in the making of foreign assistance policy. The last article
exclusively focusing on foreign assistance and separation of powers was Wallace, supra note 4,
at 293-428, 453-94. The most recent article touching on congressional control of foreign assist-
ance is Franck and Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the
Chadha Case, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1985), which provides an excellent overview of the
types of statutory controls Congress uses to control executive discretion, although it does not
focus on the foreign assistance context or its history apart from other areas of foreign relations.
Finally, numerous authors have written on one thin slice of foreign assistance legislation:
human rights restrictions. See, e.g., Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human
Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246 (1982); Moeller, Human Rights and United States
Security Assistance: El Salvador and the Case for Country-Specific Legislation, 24 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 75 (1983); Albert, The Undermining of the Legal Standards for Human Rights Violations
in United States Foreign Policy: The Case of Improvement in Guatemala, 14 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 231 (1982); Broder and Lambek, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S.
Human Rights Legislation, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 111 (1988).
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a legislative-executive committee in order to assert more effective control
over foreign assistance policy.
I. Defining Foreign Assistance
The popular meaning of "foreign assistance" is whatever the American
government gives away for free. The United States, however, channels
"assistance" to foreign countries and organizations in many forms other
than gifts and donations. For purposes of this Comment, foreign assist-
ance is defined as the transfer abroad, by the U.S. government, of money,
materials, or services by gift, loan, sale, credit, guaranty, or subsidy, and
of similar, regulated transfers by private parties.
6
American foreign assistance falls into six subject-matter areas: two
categories of aid (economic development/humanitarian and military)
conveyed in three forms (grants and loans, sales, and regulated private
commercial transfers). This results in six possible combinations of for-
eign aid: economic development and humanitarian loans and grants;
7
military loans and grants;8 economic development and humanitarian
sales;9 military sales;10 economic development and humanitarian
6. At least two statutory provisions, read together, recognize such a wide definition of
foreign assistance. 22 U.S.C. § 2394(b) states:
(I) 'foreign assistance' means any tangible or intangible item provided by the United
States Government to a foreign country or international organization under this chapter
or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice,
any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States
dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States
Government; and
(2) 'provided by the United States Government' includes, but is not limited to, foreign
assistance provided by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty.
22 U.S.C. § 2394(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) defines "security assistance" to include
military grants, economic support funds, military education and training, peacekeeping opera-
tions, arms sales (including by credit or guaranty), and arms export licenses.
7. These include bilateral loans and grants administered by the Agency for International
Development, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2151z (1982 & Supp. III 1985); housing guaranties to private
investors, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2181-2182 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); international disaster assistance,
22 U.S.C. §§ 2292-2292q (1982 & Supp. III 1985); investment insurance and credit guaranties,
administered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2199 (1982
& Supp. III 1985); in-kind food grants and loans ("PL 480"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1728b (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); and multinational development contributions, 22 U.S.C. §§ 279-290i (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
8. These include bilateral military grants and loans, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2321j (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); economic support funds, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2346-2346d (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
international military education and training, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2347-2347d (1982 & Supp. III
1985); peacekeeping operations, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2348-2348c (1982 & Supp. III 1985); antiterror-
ism assistance, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa to 2349aa-7 (Supp. III 1985); and military leases, 22
U.S.C. §§ 2796-2796c (1982).
9. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1726a (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (food sales, barter, and
credits).
Yale Journal of International Law Vol. 13:69, 1988
commercial regulation;" and military commercial regulation. 12 As dis-
cussed in Parts III and IV, the constitutionality and effectiveness of con-
gressional control over executive action vary across this spectrum of
foreign assistance. First, however, Part II develops a historical context
for understanding how Congress can effectively and constitutionally con-
trol foreign assistance policy.
II. The Evolution Of Congress' Control Over Foreign Assistance
Congress has always granted the President wide discretion to manage
foreign assistance. Authorizations are typically broad and sweeping,
13
and appropriations are in lump sums. 14 Regulations imposed by Con-
gress on the foreign assistance process have been negative restrictions
and prohibitions that bar the President from acting or spending funds in
certain ways, rather than positive guidelines on how the money is to be
spent. Congressional "control" of foreign assistance, then, denotes the
ways in which Congress limits and confines the discretion it delegates to
the President in this field.
Since 1961, when Congress passed the original template of the modern
United States foreign assistance program,15 congressional regulation has
10. See, eg., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2321j, 2751-2768 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (military sales,
credits, and guaranties).
11. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1736i-1736m (Supp. III 1985) (agricultural export subsidies and
compensation to domestic farmers for export embargoes).
12. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2771-2780 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (arms export licensing
controls).
13. Thus, for example, in the area of economic development assistance, the President is
instructed "to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine," for a
variety of broad programs such as agriculture, rural development, and nutrition, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151a(a)(1) (1982); voluntary population planning, 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b) (1982); health pro-
grams, 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(c) (Supp. III 1985); education, public administration, and human
resource development, 22 U.S.C. § 2151c(a) (Supp. III 1985); research and development of
energy production and conservation, 22 U.S.C. § 2151d(b) (Supp. III 1985); and technical
cooperation and development, 22 U.S.C. § 2151d(d) (Supp. III 1985).
In the area of military assistance, Congress has authorized the President "to furnish military
assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or
international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the secur-
ity of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive
such assistance . . . ." 22 U.S.C. § 2311(a) (Supp. III 1985).
14. See, e.g., Further Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1185,
1291-1302 (sets funding levels for broad categories of programs such as economic support
funds, agricultural development, and foreign military credit sales, with provisos setting mini-
mum amounts for a few selected countries). The President is left to decide exactly how these
programs will be carried out and to choose individual country funding levels.
15. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424,
represented a watershed in U.S. assistance policy because it created a structure for an ongoing
annual worldwide assistance program, both military and economic, in contrast to the ad hoc,
crisis-oriented programs of the past. See J. WHITE, THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID 214-15
(1974). American foreign assistance policy reaches back at least to the 1930s, when the Ex-
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evolved in three distinct phases. During the "delegation phase," from
1961 until 1972, Congress extended to the President wide latitude to by-
pass statutory restrictions imposed on foreign assistance, reserving for
itself few tools to control executive discretion. During the "investigation
phase," from 1972 until 1983, Congress tightened its controls by institut-
ing systematic and detailed reporting requirements and initiating expe-
dited voting procedures to review executive action. Finally, during the
"review phase," from 1983 until the present, Congress put itself into a
position to review and participate more effectively in foreign assistance
policy through devices such as objective definitional limits, expanded
consultation requirements, independent fact-finding, shortened authori-
zation periods, and expansion of expedited review procedures. The fol-
lowing sections examine these three phases in greater detail.
A. The Delegation Phase: 1961-1972
The early foreign aid restrictions gave wide powers to the President to
avoid their application and left Congress with few tools to control execu-
tive action. Only scattered reporting requirements and the threat of a
concurrent resolution legislative veto constrained executive action.
16
port-Import Bank made loans of $60 million to Argentina for industrial and agricultural devel-
opment, $20 million to Brazil for a steel mill, and $25 million to China for the Burma Road.
W. THORP, THE REALITY OF FOREIGN AID 48 (1971). The United States continued to pro-
vide foreign aid in subsequent years, most notably with "lend-lease" and the "destroyers-for-
bases" deal during World War II, the Marshall Plan for Europe beginning in 1948, and secur-
ity assistance to Asia during the Korean War period in the 1950s. See generally J. WHITE,
supra, at 195-237 (discussing the history of U.S. foreign aid). In 1954, Congress created the
"PL 480" program, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No.
83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (current version at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (West Supp. 1987)), an ongoing
food assistance program, designed to support domestic farming as much as to assist poor
countries.
16. See FAA of 1961, § 617, 75 Stat. at 444 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C § 2367
(1982)). A "legislative veto" occurs when Congress delegates power to the Executive, but
retains the power to "veto," by a resolution of a committee or of one or both Houses, a particu-
lar use of that power. Such congressional action has legislative effect but does not satisfy the
constitutional requirements of presentment, and, in the case of a committee or one-House
legislative veto, bicameralism. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983) (striking
down the legislative veto). An action has legislative effect if it has the "purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons" outside of the Legislative Branch. Id.
at 952.
Even before Chadha, moreover, the legislative veto in foreign aid legislation lacked power
because it permitted a twelve month wind-up period for the continued obligation and expendi-
ture of funds. Since foreign assistance funds are appropriated on a year-by-year basis, a year-
long wind-up period allows expenditure of all remaining funds, and thus amounts only to a
vague promise not to authorize and appropriate again next year. In 1973, the wind-up period
was shortened to eight months. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 (FAA of 1973), Pub. L. No.
93-189, § 14, 87 Stat. 722. Thus, in effect, the legislative veto provision was little more than a
modified sunset provision.
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Meanwhile, the President had broad discretionary power to waive
prohibitions, to avoid applying restrictions because of vague definitional
limits, and to invoke independent authorities to spend and re-direct for-
eign assistance for purposes unauthorized by Congress.
Almost all of the early restrictions on foreign assistance allowed the
President an unlimited power of waiver. Typically, the President could
make a finding that a restriction did not serve "national security inter-
ests" and waive it without informing Congress or explaining his ration-
ale.17 Where Congress did not allow a waiver, the President could still
evade the effect of congressional restrictions because of their definitional
vagueness.18 The President was not required to consult with Congress or
refer to any objective standard in complying with such definitional limits.
In addition to this broad authority to waive or to avoid legislative
prohibitions, Congress also gave the President five independent spending
powers: special funds authority, contingency fund authority, military
drawdown authority, transfer authority, and reprogramming powers.
The special funds authority permitted the President to authorize and use
any foreign assistance funds up to $350 million "without regard to the
requirements of the [Foreign Assistance Act]" whenever he determined it
17. Thus, assistance to Cuba was prohibited "[e]xcept as may be deemed necessary by the
President in the interest of the United States." Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (FAA of 1963),
Pub. L. No. 88-205, § 301(e)(1), 77 Stat. 379, 386 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1982)).
Assistance was prohibited to the government of any country failing to pay a debt to any U. S.
citizen for goods or services furnished, provided that "the President does not find such action
contrary to the national security." Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (FAA of 1962), Pub. L. No.
87-565, § 301(d)(2), 76 Stat. 255, 260 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c) (1982)). No develop-
ment loans were permitted to foreign enterprises that might compete with U.S. business in the
U.S. domestic market unless the President determined that a waiver is in the "national security
interest." FAA of 1961, § 620(d), 75 Stat. at 445 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(d)
(1982)). Assistance to communist countries was prohibited unless the President found that
"(1) such assistance is vital to the security of the United States; (2) the recipient country is not
controlled by the international Communist conspiracy; and (3) such assistance will further
promote the independence of the recipient country from international communism," FAA of
1962, § 301(f), 76 Stat. at 261 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f)(1) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
18. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 (FAA of 1966) prohibited assistance to any coun-
try "engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts" directed against the United States
or countries that receive U.S. assistance. Although the President was not permitted to waive
this restriction by a contrary determination of the U.S. national security interest, he was ex-
plicitly given responsibility for determining which countries were preparing for aggressive mili-
tary efforts and for rescinding the prohibition if he later determined and reported to Congress
that the military efforts had ceased and that he had "received assurances satisfactory to him"
that the military efforts would not be continued. FAA of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-583,
§ 301(h)(1), 80 Stat. 795, 805-06, repealed by International Security and Development Cooper-
ation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 734(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1519, 1560. Similarly, military
assistance was to be terminated to any country in "substantial violation" of the regulation
governing its use. FAA of 1962, § 201(a), 76 Stat. at 259 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2314(d)(1) (1982)).
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to be "important to the security of the United States." 19 Although there
was a requirement that the President "promptly notify" certain commit-
tees and officers of Congress of any such determinations, 20 he could use
up to $50 million "pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to
specify the nature of the use of such funds, which certification should be
deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts."' 21 The contingency
fund authority permitted the President to use up to $300 million for eco-
nomic development and humanitarian purposes "when he determines
such use to be important to the national interest."' 22 The drawdown au-
thority permitted the President to withdraw up to $300 million of materi-
als and services from Defense Department stocks if he determined it to
be "vital to the security of the United States."' 23 The transfer authority
permitted the President to transfer funds within one country between
different accounts. For example, upon no more than a finding that it was
"necessary for the purposes of this Act," the President could transfer
money from the economic support fund to the military grant account.
24
Finally, there were no statutory limitations on the President's
reprogramming power. This power allowed the Executive to transfer
funds within the same account between different countries.
The early legislation required four types of reports. First, the Presi-
dent had to submit, at the end of each fiscal year, one annual report "to
make public all information concerning operations" of foreign assistance
programs.25 Second, the President had to furnish, upon request of a con-
gressional committee, any information specified by the committee.
26
19. FAA of 1961, § 614(a), 75 Stat. at 444 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Section 614(b) of the act permitted the President to furnish unlim-
ited assistance from the Economic Support Fund account to "meet the responsibilities or
objectives of the United States in Germany, including West Berlin, and without regard to such
provisions of law as he determines should be disregarded to achieve this purpose." Id.
§ 614(b), 75 Stat. at 444 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2364 (1982)).
20. Id. § 634(d), 75 Stat. at 455.
21. Id. § 614(c), 75 Stat. at 444 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2364(c) (1982)). In
1966, Congress required that the President "promptly and fully inform" the Speaker of the
House and the chairman and the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee of each use of funds under § 614(c), but did not require any explanation or justifi-
cation for such use. FAA of 1966, § 301(g), 80 Stat. at 805.
22. FAA of 1961, § 451, 75 Stat. at 434 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2261 (1982)).
23. Id. § 510(a), 75 Stat. at 437 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2318 (1982)).
24. Id. § 610, 75 Stat. at 442. The transfer could not take away more than 10% of the
source account nor augment the target account by more than 20%. Id. The President re-
mained free to increase any account by more than 20% by employing his special funds or
drawdown authority rather than his transfer authority. Id. § 510, 75 Stat. at 437 (drawdown
authority); id. § 614, 75 Stat. at 444 (special funds authority).
25. Id. § 634(a), 75 Stat. at 455.
26. Id. § 634(b). Failure of the President to respond within 35 days would automatically
suspend assistance under the provision about which information was re'quested. Id. § 634(c).
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Third, the President had to notify Congress promptly after exercising his
special funds, drawdown, or transfer authority (but not his contingency
fund or reprogramming authority).2 7 Finally, Congress required the
President to submit a report in January of each year on any assistance
furnished for purposes "substantially different" in nature from, or in ex-
cess of 50% greater than, the proposed expenditures included in the
amount justified to Congress prior to appropriation.2 8
B. The Investigation Phase: 1972-1983
1. New Congressional Controls
In the wake of disclosures about military operations in Cambodia,2 9
Congress expanded its capacity to monitor and review the Executive's
management of foreign assistance. This subsection discusses the three
principal congressional reforms and examines their application in two
areas-arms sales and human rights.
Congress' first step, contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971,30
was to require the Executive to reduce to writing all "findings" or "deter-
minations" mandated by statute in order to waive restrictions. 31 By re-
27. Id. § 634(d) (special funds and transfer); id. § 5 10(a), 75 Stat. at 437 (drawdown). The
President was required only to file quarterly reports as to his use of the contingency fund. Id.
§ 451(b), 75 Stat. at 434, amended by FAA of 1962, § 109(b), 76 Stat. at 259. There was no
mention of a reporting requirement for the exercise of reprogramming authority. FAA of
1961, § 634, 75 Stat. at 455.
28. FAA of 1961, § 634(d).
29. President Nixon's secret war in Cambodia in the early 1970s illustrates the abuse of
executive power made possible by Congress during the "delegation phase." The Senate For-
eign Relations Committee observed in 1972 that during the previous year the President had
used his special funds and transfer authorities to effect seventeen waivers of congressional re-
strictions and to allot Sl10 million to Cambodia. S. REP. No. 431, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1883, 1894-95. The Committee
observed:
In none of these cases (or in any of the others in which the President relied on addition
[sic] waiver authority) was the Congress notified before the President acted. In fact, in
many of these cases the President waited a month before notifying the Congress of any
action at all.... Last year the Executive Branch gave Cambodia $7.9 million in military
aid and, after the fact, obtained a Presidential determination which was made retroactive
in an effort to legalize what had already been done.
Id. at 1895 (emphasis in original). The Committee noted as well that the President had made
an oral determination to authorize $3 million in aid to Ceylon and did not submit it to Con-
gress in written form for two and a half months. Id. at 1896.
30. FAA of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-226, 86 Stat. 20 (1972). It did not become law until early
1972.
31. Id. § 304(b), 86 Stat. at 29 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2414(a)-(c) (1982)). It also required
that the President permit any committee or congressional officer access to any requested infor-
mation relating to any finding or determination, even if a report that had been requested had
not yet been transmitted. Id. (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2414(d) (1982)). The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee noted, "Last year the Committee staff was denied access in the field to
information on military aid to Cambodia on the grounds that no information on the subject
could be released prior to transmittal to Congress of a related Presidential determination." S.
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quiring a prior written finding, Congress hoped to prevent the President
from exercising his power to waive a restriction and only afterwards
making a formal finding and notifying Congress. As part of this first
reform, Congress required the President, when he invoked his independ-
ent authority over special funds, drawdowns, and account transfers, to
give prior notice of the statutory source of his authority, his justification,
and the extent to which he intended to exercise the authority.32 Congress
also required presidential notification within thirty days of enactment of
an appropriations bill of the receiving country's intended use of the U.S.
funds and of the type of assistance. 33 The President was also prohibited
from subsequently exceeding the amount reported to Congress for mili-
tary grants and economic support funds to one country by more than
10%, unless he determined it to be "in the security interest" to waive this
limit and provided Congress ten days' notice and a justification of his
waiver.3 4 This had the effect of requiring both notice to Congress and a
"security interest" finding before any substantial exercise of the Presi-
dent's independent authorities.
35
REP. No. 431, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1883, 1896.
32. FAA of 1971, § 304(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 28 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2411
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). This section originated in the Special Foreign Assistance Act of
1971. It initially applied only to Cambodia and contained the additional requirement of a 30-
day pre-notification. Pub. L. No. 91-652, § 8, 84 Stat. 1942, 1943 (1971). In the FAA of 1971,
Congress generalized the pre-notification requirement but declined to set a specific waiting
period: "It was the understanding of the Committee of Conference that, while not specifying
the number of days, the advance notice should not just be immediately contemporaneous with
the use of these authorities." S. CONF. REP. No. 590, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1937, 1946.
33. FAA of 1971, § 304(b), 86 Stat. at 28 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2413(a)
(1982 & Supp. 11 1985)).
34. Id., 86 Stat. at 28-29 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2413(b) (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). In 1974, Congress amended this section so that it would not apply if the amount of
excess was less than $1 million. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (FAA of 1974), Pub. L. No.
93-559, § 21, 88 Stat. 1795, 1801. This restriction on the use of excess funds overlapped the
rules regarding transfers between accounts. The prior statutory framework governing the
President's authority to transfer funds between accounts allowed additions of up to 20% to
any single account whenever he determined it to be "necessary for the purposes of the Act."
See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The combined effect of the new requirement with
the old one was to permit transfers to military assistance and economic support fund accounts
of up to 10% of previously appropriated amounts on a finding that it was "necessary," while
permitting transfers greater than 10% only with 10 days' notice and a finding of a security
interest. In 1974, Congress applied the 10-day advance notice requirement to economic devel-
opment assistance and peacekeeping operations. FAA of 1974, § 21, 88 Stat. at 1801.
35. From 1972 to 1977, Congress continued to restrict the President's independent author-
ities. First, starting in 1973, the use of the contingency fund was to be "primarily for disaster
relief purposes," in contrast to any use "important to the national interest" as allowed by the
previous statute. FAA of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 10, 87 Stat. 714, 719. In 1974 Congress
restricted the fund to "emergency" purposes, and by the same year, the contingency fund pool
had been reduced to only $5 million from a high of $300 million in 1961. FAA of 1974,
§ 28(c), 88 Stat. at 1803. Second, in 1974, Congress prohibited any augmentation of develop-
ment assistance accounts through the use of special funds or transfer authorities. Id. § 19, 88
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The second reform created much more detailed substantive reporting
requirements. In several pieces of legislation, Congress made clear that
the President could no longer act upon unsupported findings or determi-
nations; rather, he was now required to provide detailed statements of
the facts involved and his justification for action. 36 This promoted both
internal accountability within the executive branch and external account-
ability to Congress and the public at large. Accountability within the
executive branch was increased because a procedure for information
gathering was imposed that involved more people and resources in policy
evaluation and decision-making. Increased external accountability was
introduced in the form of a requirement that the President consider the
relevant findings of other persons or groups and certify that he had inves-
tigated and considered certain relevant facts in producing a finding or
determination. 3
7
Congress' third reform was to initiate the use of expedited or "fast-
track" legislative consideration procedures to review presidential find-
ings. Typically, for any resolution eligible for such treatment, the
number of days for committee consideration and the amount of time for
floor debate were limited, and amendments were prohibited. 38 This pro-
vision reinforced the Executive's external accountability by greatly in-
creasing the probability that a congressional vote would actually take
Stat. at 1800 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2360(a)(1982) and as amended at 22 U.S.C.A §2364(a)
(West Supp. 1987)). At the same time, Congress permitted unlimited transfers within one
country from the military assistance to the development assistance account with 10 days' prior
notification to Congress. Id. § 19(a) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2360(c) (1982)). Third, in 1976,
Congress required the President, in order to invoke his drawdown authority, to determine that
an "unforeseen emergency" existed that required "immediate military assistance to a foreign
country or international organization," which could not be met under any other law, and
which would result in "serious harm to vital United States security interests" if the United
States failed to respond. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976 (AECA of 1976), Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 102, 90 Stat. 729, 730 (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. § 2318(a) (1982) and 22 U.S.C.A. § 2318(a) (West Supp. 1987)). Fourth, also in 1976,
Congress withdrew the President's option to invoke a "national security interest" waiver to
evade the country-eligibility requirements for military grant aid (but not credit or guaranties).
Id. § 304(a), 90 Stat. at 754-55 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1982)). Finally,
in 1977, Congress required 15 days' advance notice of any obligation of funds not justified, or
in excess of the amount justified, to Congress at the beginning of the year. International De-
velopment and Food Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-88, § 130, 91 Stat. 533, 543-44
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2394-1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Many of these restric-
tions were part of Congress' overall program to phase out the military grant assistance pro-
grams in favor of arms sales. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1378, 1387-88.
36. See, e.g., AECA of 1976, 90 Stat. 729.
37. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying-text.
38. The "fast-track" procedures had been used to expedite the consideration of other for-
eign policy resolutions, such as the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 7,
87 Stat. 555, 557-58 (1973), and agreements negotiated under the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, §§ 151-154, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08. They were enacted not as statutory provisions
but as part of the internal, parliamentary rules of each House. But see infra note 140.
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place. 39 The fast-track thus offered Congress an effective power of review
and, as a result, indirectly encouraged the Executive to comply in good
faith with reporting requirements.4°
2. Arms Sales
Statutory changes in the field of arms sales illustrate Congress' increas-
ing supervision of executive policy decisions in the foreign aid arena.
The 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act gave the President general author-
ity to sell arms to friendly nations.4 1 Under this Act, the President was
required to make a finding that a proposed sale would "strengthen the
security of the United States and promote world peace," 42 but was not
required to communicate or justify the finding to Congress. Although
the law required the President to make two reports concerning each sale,
neither report was due prior to the sale, when Congress would be in a
position to object.43 In 1974, however, Congress imposed on the Execu-
tive a twenty-day report-and-wait period before he could issue a letter of
offer to sell $25 million or more of defense articles or services, during
which time Congress could disapprove with a concurrent resolution leg-
islative veto. 4 Then, in 1976, Congress lengthened the report-and-wait
period to thirty days for arms sales of any size.45 As for sales of $25
39. Half the battle in passing legislation is getting the full Congress to vote on a resolution.
The fast-track mechanism increases the probability of obtaining a vote because, typically, any
member of Congress can introduce an eligible joint resolution.
40. Even if Congress can only muster a simple majority, and not the two-thirds necessary
to override a veto, the fast-track imposes a political constraint by putting the President in the
uncomfortable position of having to veto the legislation.
41. Pub. L. No. 90-629, § 1, 82 Stat. 1320, 1321 (1968).
42. Id. § 3(a)(1), 82 Stat. at 1322 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
43. The President was required to "promptly submit" a report on the implementation of
an agreement with the recipient country that prohibited subsequent transfers of the arms to
other parties. Id. § 3(a), 82 Stat. at 1322. The Secretary of State was required to submit semi-
annual reports giving details on private transfers of U.S. arms abroad during the previous six
months. Id. § 36(a), 82 Stat. at 1326.
44. FAA of 1974, § 45(a)(5), 88 Stat. at 1814-15. If the President certified that an "emer-
gency" existed, then he would not have to wait the 20 days for possible congressional disap-
proval. But he would still have to notify Congress prior to issuing a letter of offer. Id.
45. AECA of 1976, § 204(a), 90 Stat. at 735-36. Congress accomplished this by requiring
the President to withhold consent to the nontransfer agreement for 30 days, which itself was a
prerequisite for the foreign country's eligibility to buy arms. No legislative veto was included
for arms sales of less than $25 million.
The President retained authority to waive the report-and-wait requirement upon finding an
"emergency." In 1977, Congress required the President to justify his finding of an emergency:
"[H]e shall set forth in the certification a detailed justification for his determination, including
a description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the
letter of offer and a discussion of the national security interests involved." International Secur-
ity Assistance Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-92, § 19(c), 93 Stat. 701, 709-10 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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million or more,46 Congress required the President to consider and re-
port on thirteen different factors and justifications. 47 Finally, for such
large sales, Congress strengthened its legislative veto power with a provi-
sion for fast-track consideration of any concurrent resolution. 48
3. Human Rights
Human rights legislation also illustrates Congress' approach to foreign
assistance during the "investigation" phase. In 1975, Congress passed
the first piece of binding legislation tying foreign assistance to the human
rights conduct of foreign governments.49 In 1976, it widened the human
rights prohibition from economic development and humanitarian assist-
ance to military assistance, providing that "no security assistance may be
provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." 50
From the start, Congress was at a severe disadvantage in trying to define
46. The coverage was expanded to include not only sales of any defense articles or services
in amounts of $25 million or more but also sales of $7 million or more of "major defense
equipment," defined as articles on the U.S. Munitions List with research and development
costs greater than $50 million or production costs greater than $200 million. AECA of 1976,
§§ 211(a), 215, 90 Stat. at 741-42, 747.
47. Id. § 211(a), 90 Stat. at 742-43. These included the reasons why the proposed sale was
in the national interest, the name of each contractor expected to provide the defense article or
service, the availability of comparable articles or services from other countries, the effect on
regional stability, the effect on U.S. relations with neighboring countries, and the impact on
arms control.
48. Id., 90 Stat. at 743 (referring to § 601(b)). The fast-track procedures in the Senate
provided for committee discharge after 10 days upon motion (privileged for consideration)
approved by the entire Senate; for a 10 hour limit on debate; and for no amendments. Id.
§ 601(b), 90 Stat. at 765-66. The House procedures were more limited than those of the Sen-
ate: "For the purpose of expediting the consideration and adoption of concurrent resolutions
under this subsection, a motion to proceed to the consideration of any such resolution after it
has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the
House of Representatives." Id. § 211(a), 90 Stat. at 743. This would presumably allow for
rapid floor action but may not prevent a committee from "bottling up" the resolution until
after the 30-day lapse.
49. In 1974, Congress passed a "sense of the Congress" resolution barring aid to countries
that violate human rights. FAA of 1974, § 46, 88 Stat. at 1815-16. In 1975, the prohibition
became mandatory for development assistance. However, if the Executive determined that the
assistance would "directly benefit the needy people" in such a country, the aid would still be
granted. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161,
§ 310, 89 Stat. 860 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). The
Administrator of the Agency for International Development was required to submit a report
with a detailed explanation of the assistance to be provided and how it would directly benefit
needy people. If Congress disagreed with the Administrator's justification, it reserved the right
to terminate assistance by concurrent resolution. Id.
50. AECA of 1976, § 301(a), 90 Stat. at 748 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2304
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)). "Security assistance" was defined to include military grants, mili-
tary sales, military education and training, peacekeeping operations, economic support funds,
arms credits, guarantees, and export licenses. Id., 90 Stat. at 750. Human rights was a grow-
ing policy concern of Congress in the mid-1970s which the Executive Branch did not share
until the election of President Carter. See generally Cohen, supra note 5, at 249-50.
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"human rights" and to determine the extent of violations necessary to
trigger the prohibitions.5 1 To compensate, Congress instituted the most
substantively detailed reporting requirements yet enacted. One require-
ment was an annual report by the Secretary of State on the human rights
practices of all countries proposed as recipients of security assistance.5 2
This reporting requirement was distinctive because it instructed the Sec-
retary to rely on specified sources of information. Congress created the
new position of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs, and required that this officer assist in preparing the
report.53 The creation of this position was meant not only to increase the
Executive's information gathering capacity, 54 but also to inject a more
independent viewpoint into the information flow from the foreign service
bureaus abroad. 55 In addition, the Secretary was required to give "due
consideration" both to the reports of "appropriate international organi-
zations" such as the Red Cross and to the extent to which foreign gov-
ernments allowed unimpeded investigations.
56
Another reporting requirement, triggered at the request of Congress,
concerned the human rights practices in specific countries. With respect
to each such country, it required the Secretary of State to perform a de-
tailed balancing test to justify U.S. policy. The Secretary had to present
51. For example, it is difficult to define a "consistent pattern." Likewise, it is difficult to
determine if it is "the government" or forces outside of the government's control that are
responsible for violations. Finally, even though "gross violations" are defined in a list for
purposes of the statute, the list is not exhaustive. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 252; Moel-
ler, supra note 5, at 78-79; Albert, supra note 5, at 249-51 (noting problems of defining "mili-
tary advisor," "basic human needs," and "improvement").
52. AECA of 1976, § 301(a), 90 Stat. at 748-49.
53. Id. § 301(b), 90 Stat. at 750. Congress originally created the position as Coordinator
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The position was upgraded to Assistant Secre-
tary status one year later, in 1977. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-105, § 109(a)(1)(A), 91 Stat. 844, 846 (1977).
54. The Assistant Secretary was to "maintain continuous observation and review of all
matters pertaining to human rights" by "gathering detailed information," "preparing the state-
ments and reports to Congress," and "making recommendations to the Secretary of State and
the Administrator of the Agency for International Development." AECA of 1976, § 301(b),
90 Stat. at 750.
55. If the Secretary of State had been left to prepare reports on his own, he would have had
to rely on the facts and information presented to him by the career foreign service officers in
each country, who often view their primary role as maintaining smooth relations with their
host country and thus promote a "clientist" perspective. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 256-60.
The Assistant Secretary, according to one observer, functioned with vigor as a counterweight
to the regional bureaus during the first few years. Id. at 261-62. During the Reagan Adminis-
tration, the first nominee for the Assistant Secretary position, Ernest Lefever, believed that the
United States "had no right to promote human rights in sovereign states" and was eventually
forced to withdraw. The post was filled by Elliot Abrams, who also opposed a vigorous human
rights policy. When Abrams was promoted, Richard Schifter was appointed. He has estab-
lished a strong rapport with Congress and human rights groups. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at
B6, col. 5.
56. AECA of 1976, § 301(a), 90 Stat. at 749.
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"all the available information" regarding the country's human rights
practices and the steps the United States had taken to promote and to
call attention to respect for human rights in that country. In addition, he
was required to describe any "extraordinary circumstances" that "neces-
sitate[d]" a continuation of assistance, and to decide whether "on all the
facts" it was in the "national interest" of the United States to continue
such assistance.57 After such a report was requested, any joint resolution
to restrict assistance to the country in consideration would be considered
with fast-track procedures. 58
Finally, Congress developed a related breed of reporting requirements
in country-specific human rights legislation. Country-specific prohibi-
tions were not new to foreign assistance legislation,5 9 but became increas-
ingly common as an alternative to the general human rights-based
prohibition because the legislation could employ more specific language
when applied to particular countries.60 Some of these country-specific
prohibitions employed highly specific and detailed certification require-
ments61 and at least one provided for fast-track review.
62
57. Id. Failure to submit the report within 30 days automatically terminated delivery of
further assistance, except when specifically authorized by law for such country, unless and
until such statement was transmitted. Id.
58. Id. § 601(b), 90 Stat. at 765-66. The President vetoed the original version of AECA,
which contained seven legislative vetoes, including one for termination of assistance for human
rights violations upon concurrent resolution of Congress. After the veto, Congress passed a
new version of the AECA that provided for review through joint resolution, but with expedited
consideration procedures (in the Senate only). H. R. REP. No. 1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1378, 1380-81.
Similarly, in the trade area, the Executive's disagreement with a legislative veto (one-
House) prompted the substitution of expedited procedures in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-618, §§ 151-154, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001-08. See Koh, Congressional Controls on Presiden-
tial Trade Policymaking after I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. AND POL. 1191, 1208
n.47 (1986).
59. For example, assistance has been prohibited to Cuba since 1961. FAA of 1961,
§ 620(a), 75 Stat. at 444-45 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1982)). Assistance
has also been prohibited to a number of other communist countries since 1962. FAA of 1962,
§ 301(d)(3), 76 Stat. at 261 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985)).
60. See generally Moeller, supra note 5. Since 1975 Congress has restricted aid on human
rights grounds at various times to Chile, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Paraguay, Uruguay, the Philippines, and Zaire. Cohen, supra note 5, at 255-56.
61. The 1981 prohibition on assistance to El Salvador, for example, allowed the President
to waive the prohibition only upon certifying that the Salvadoran government:
(1) is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized
human rights; (2) is achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed
forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citi-
zens by these forces; (3) is making continued progress in implementing essential economic
and political reforms, including the land reform program; (4) is committed to the holding
of free elections at an early date and to that end has demonstrated its good faith efforts to
begin discussions with all major political factions in El Salvador which have declared their
willingness to find and implement an equitable political solution to the conflict, with such
solution to involve a commitment to-(A) a renouncement of further military or paramili-
tary activity; and (B) the electoral process with internationally recognized observers.
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C. The Review Phase: 1983-1987
1. New Congressional Controls
The final phase of congressional control began in 1983 with the invali-
dation of the legislative veto in LNS. v. Chadha.63 Critics of Chadha
argue that it forced Congress to choose between the long leash of unlim-
ited presidential discretion and the short leash of requiring prior congres-
sional approval of every executive action." In the foreign assistance
context, while Congress may have loosened its controls in some areas, 65
in others it tightened its controls after Chadha with innovative tools
designed to narrow executive discretion. Congress' new control devices
include objective definitional standards, in-person consultation require-
ments, shortened authorization periods, and independent or "shadow"
fact-finding bodies appointed by Congress. This section first analyzes
these controls and then examines their application in the context of
America's war on drugs and assistance to Nicaraguan contras.
The first control, numerical definitional standards, narrows loopholes
by setting an objective standard as a reference point for invoking foreign
assistance restrictions. 66 The disadvantage of employing numerical stan-
dards is that Congress must not only specify what actions are sanction-
able, but also determine what level of such actions will trigger sanctions.
Because these restrictions often apply to many different countries, setting
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113,
§ 728(d), 95 Stat. 1519, 1556 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370 note (1982 & Supp. III
1985)).
62. The 1980 prohibition on assistance to Angolan rebels, for example, provided for fast-
track consideration of the President's recommendation of renewed funding. International Se-
curity and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-533, § 118(b), 94 Stat. 3131,
3141, repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 811, 99 Stat. 264 (1985).
63. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
64. Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to
refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with the hopeless task of
writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the
entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the
Executive Branch and independent agencies.
Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
65. For example, in 1986, Congress amended the AECA of 1976 in several places to re-
move all concurrent resolutions and to substitute joint resolutions. Arms Export Control Act,
Legislative Veto, Pub. L. No. 99-247, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 9.
The amended sections included: § 3(d)(2)(A)(B) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. 2753(d)
(West Supp. 1987)) (congressional review subsequent to report-and-wait period for presidential
consent to recipient country's pledge to maintain the security of the arms); § 36(b)(1) (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2776(c) (West Supp. 1987)) (congressional review subsequent to
report-and-wait period for sales of defense articles and services for $50 million or more, design
and construction services for $200 million or more, or major defense equipment for $14 million
or more); § 63(a)(1), (b), (c) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 2796b(a)(1) (West Supp.
1987)) (congressional approval of President's decision to lease or loan defense articles).
66. For further discussion of objective standards, see infra notes 143-145 and accompany-
ing text.
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precise boundaries is not an easy task. Nevertheless, by using a numeri-
cal standard, Congress can reduce the subjectivity of standards employed
in human rights legislation.67 A numerical standard for evaluating infor-
mation sets more certain fact-finding targets and strengthens the value of
other controls such as detailed reporting requirements.
68
The second control, in-person consultation requirements, institutes a
formalized executive-legislative consultation process.69 Even when Con-
gress requires the President to report-and-wait prior to taking action, it
faces political pressure to acquiesce in an already announced policy.
Consultation, as distinguished from notification, involves Congress at the
planning stages prior to executive implementation of its findings. 70 Pre-
vious consultation requirements were worded as vague admonitions to
consult with Congress and had proved largely ineffective.71 Therefore
Congress has created formal statutory requirements that specific execu-
tive branch members meet with members of appropriate congressional
committees, and that the substance of such conversations appear in the
Congressional Record.72 Although cumbersome, the specificity of these
requirements makes it far more difficult for the Executive to ignore them
or treat them as notification requirements.
Pursuant to the third control, shortened authorization periods, Con-
gress appropriates funds for an entire year but authorizes their release in
prorated amounts on a quarterly, trimesterly, or semiannual basis.73 To
trigger the funds' release, the Executive must comply with certain report-
ing requirements, and Congress must fail to pass a fast-track joint resolu-
tion of disapproval. This approach encourages good faith compliance
with reporting requirements because such reports serve as foundations
for subsequent fast-track review. It fosters the Executive's external ac-
67. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
68. Such precise standards also give foreign countries fair warning of impending restric-
tions, potentially deterring sanctionable behavior.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
70. The Congressional Research Service defined "effective consultation" as the "involve-
ment of an appropriate representation of Congress in the making of significant foreign policy
decisions." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STRENGTHENING EXECUTIVE-LEGISLA-
TIVE CONSULTATION IN FOREIGN POLICY, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss. 26 (Comm. Print 1983).
71. The experience with the War Powers Resolution is instructive. This legislation re-
quired the President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" before introducing
U.S. forces into situations of imminent hostilities. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-
148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)). Because the requirement was so
vague it was not controversial; despite vetoing the Resolution, President Nixon praised the
consultation provision. Subsequent Presidents did not in fact consult "in every possible in-
stance." In the Mayaguez incident and the Iran hostage rescue attempt, for example, consulta-
tions did not take place until after action was taken. In the invasion of Grenada, consultation
took place only three hours prior to the attack. See Franck & Bob, supra note 5, at 940-41.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
73. See, eg., infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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countability in an environment of ongoing rather than annual congres-
sional oversight.
Finally, the fourth control, shadow fact-finding, involves creating an
independent fact-finding body appointed by congressional leadership to
investigate and report on foreign country conduct relevant to certain for-
eign assistance restrictions.74 This system enhances earlier measures
designed to widen the number of sources of information for Congress.
75
Although Congress cannot force the Executive to adopt such findings as
its own because of the Executive's constitutional role as interpreter of the
laws, 76 shadow fact-finding nevertheless keeps Congress better informed
and keeps the Executive "honest" in its own fact-finding efforts.
2. Anti-Drug Policy
In the wake of Chadha, Congress established aggressive control de-
vices in legislation conditioning foreign aid on the steps taken by drug-
producing countries to reduce production, processing, and trade in illicit
drugs. Most significantly, it included the new control devices of numeri-
cal definitional standards and in-person consultation requirements. Since
1972, Congress had conditioned foreign assistance on anti-drug policies
of drug-producing countries, but had left to presidential discretion the
determination of whether a country was complying with U.S. require-
ments. 77 Late in 1983, Congress expanded the annual reporting require-
ment, setting numerical targets and forecasts on reductions in drug
74. See, e.g., infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
75. The human rights legislation directed the Executive to coordinate its fact-finding under
the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and to give "due
consideration" to human rights findings of outside groups. See supra notes 52-56 and accom-
panying text.
76. Although Congress may require the President to consider the factual findings of
outside persons or organizations, it cannot require the President to accept them. This would
intrude upon the executive power to interpret the law. In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court defined
the executive function:
Appellants suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller General in the Act are
essentially ministerial and mechanical so that their performance does not constitute "exe-
cution of the law" in a meaningful sense. On the contrary, we view these functions as
plainly entailing execution of the law in Constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of "execution" of
the law.
106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1985).
77. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-352, § 503, 86 Stat.
489, 496, provided that the President may fund anti-drug operations and that the President
shall suspend all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Foreign Military Sales Act
(now the AECA), and PL 480 "with respect to any country when the President determines
that the government of such country has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic
drugs" from being produced and transported into the U.S. "Such suspension shall continue
until the President determines that the government of such country has taken adequate steps"
to curtail production. Id.
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production. 78 It mandated that the President, in deciding whether to
waive the prohibition on assistance, give "foremost consideration" to
whether the country had met the maximum expected reductions in drug
production determined to be achievable in the annual report.79
Congress also created a formal process for executive-legislative consul-
tation in anti-drug policy. After the report was submitted, "in-person"
discussions were required between designated representatives of the Pres-
ident and members of the appropriate congressional committees. 80 The
substance of each consultation was to be published in the Congressional
Record, 81 after which the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs were directed to hold public hearings. 82 Fi-
nally, in 1986, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act cut off assistance to any "major
illicit drug producing country, ' 83 defined objectively as any country pro-
ducing more than five metric tons of opium or five hundred metric tons
of marijuana or cocaine in a fiscal year.84 Although Congress permitted
the President to waive the restrictions, the President had to make exten-
sive certifications, and his determinations were subject to fast-track
reversal.
85
78. The Department of State Authorization Act (Dept. of State Authorization Act), Fis-
cal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 1003(b), 97 Stat. 1017, 1053-57 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2291(e) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), converted the existing requirement
that the President submit a general annual report on U.S. international anti-drug policy into a
particularized demand for: information about the "policies adopted, agreements concluded,
and programs implemented," 97 Stat. at 1053; a "detailed status report" on the production in
suspected drug countries, id. at 1054; a description of all U.S. assistance to these countries, a
description of the "plans, programs, and timetables" each country had adopted for the elimi-
nation of drugs, "a discussion of the adequacy of the legal and law enforcement measures
taken and the accomplishments achieved in accord with these plans," "a determination by the
President of the maximum reductions in illicit drug production which are achievable during
the next fiscal year," and the actual reduction in drug production achieved. Id.
79. Id. at 1056. The President is also instructed to consider whether the country has taken
law enforcement measures "to the maximum extent possible" as evidenced by the "arrest and
prosecution of violators." Id.
80. Id. at 1055.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2005, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3207-1, 3207-61.
84. Dept. of State Authorization Act, § 1003(b), 97 Stat. at 1056. These numerical limits
do not, of course, guarantee ready enforcement of the assistance prohibition. Congress could
not expect, for example, accurate determinations of the quantity of cocaine grown in the jun-
gles of Bolivia. Nevertheless, the attempt to define "major drug producing countries" in nu-
merical production terms represented a shift from a subjective to an objective standard.
85. To waive the prohibition on assistance, the President must determine that the country
has either cooperated fully with U.S. efforts or taken adequate steps on its own, or that the
"vital national interests" of the United States require providing assistance. Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, § 2005, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at 3207-62. The
President must make a "full and complete description of the vital national interests placed at
risk" and weigh these risks against the risks to the "vital national interests" of failing to pre-
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3. Assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras
In the area of assistance to the Nicaraguan contras, Congress has cast
a net of complex reporting procedures, presidential certifications, and
congressional review requirements. Most significantly, it has employed
the control devices of shortened authorizations subject to fast-track re-
view and shadow fact-finding commissions. In 1984, although Congress
prohibited military funds to the contras,86 it created a procedure by
which the President, after certifying at any time with detailed informa-
tion that the Nicaraguan government was destabilizing other Central
American nations with materiel or monetary support,87 could gain access
to a fast-track joint resolution appropriating up to $14 million of military
assistance. 88 In 1985, Congress enacted a similar ban on military
funds,89 but again promised fast-track consideration of a request from
the President "at any time" for military assistance. 90 It appropriated $27
million in "humanitarian" aid, but scheduled the release of funds one-
vent the country's drug output. Id. Finally, within 30 days of the President's waiver, any joint
resolution of disapproval that is introduced receives fast-track consideration. Id. at 3207-63.
86. Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066(a), 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837, 1935. During fiscal year 1985, Congress prohibited
any agency involved in intelligence activities from obligating or expending funds to support,
"directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." Id. This form of
the Boland Amendment recurred, without any associated reporting and review requirements,
in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-618, § 801, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3298, 3304; the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, § 105, 1986 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(99 Stat.) 1002, 1003; the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-
569, §106, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3190, 3191; and the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 1351, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3816, 3995.
87. Continuing Appropriations, 1985, § 8066(b)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (98 Stat.) at 1935. In addition, the President was required to analyze the military signif-
icance of such support, to state that he determined assistance for military or paramilitary
operations to be necessary, and to justify the amount and types of assistance in view of U.S.
policy goals, including an explanation of how support would further the goal of achieving a
Contadora agreement. Id.
88. Id. § 8066(c)-(d), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 1936-37. The
House procedures were more streamlined than in earlier versions of fast-track legislation. See
supra note 48. Earlier versions accorded only a "highly privileged" status to a joint resolution.
Section 8066(c) provided for 15-day committee discharge, 10-hour debate limit, and no
amendments.
89. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (ISDCA of 1985),
Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 722, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 190, 249-59.
The prohibition was more broadly worded to ban any funds, presumably from any source, to
the contras except for $27 million in "humanitarian" assistance. The previous year, Congress
had only banned funds from "the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or
any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities." Continuing
Appropriations, 1985, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) at 1935.
90. ISDCA of 1985, § 722(p)-(t), 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) at
257-59. The President could also request, in the same manner, funds to promote a peace pro-
cess based on the Contadora negotiations. Id. § 722(k)-(o), 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (99 Stat.) at 256-57. The only difference in procedures from the previous year's bill was
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third at a time, conditioned on the submission of reports by the President
every ninety days.91 Then, in 1986, Congress appropriated $100 million,
permitting $30 million for military assistance. Again, it required that the
funds be disbursed in three stages, conditioned not only upon the submis-
sion of reports by the President, but also upon the failure of a subsequent
joint resolution of disapproval considered under fast-track procedures. 92
In addition, the 1986 measure created an independent five-person com-
mission, appointed by congressional leadership, to serve as an alternative
and competing source of information on events in Nicaragua. 93 The
Commission was instructed to "monitor and report" on the internal re-
form efforts of the contras and the status of peace negotiations,94 as well
as to prepare and submit reports nearly identical to those required of the
President.
95
that amendments were permitted to the joint resolution in the Senate. Id. § 722(o)(2), (t)(2),
1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) at 257, 259.
91. Id. §§ 722(g)(3), (j), 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) at 254, 255.
These reports had to provide a "detailed statement" of progress in reaching a negotiated settle-
ment, a "detailed accounting" of the funds already disbursed, and a "discussion" of the alleged
human rights violations by both the Nicaraguan government and rebels. Id.
92. Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-500, §§ 206-216,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1783, 1783-299 to -308. Forty percent
of the funds were made available for immediate expenditure, 20% could be disbursed no ear-
lier than October 15, 1986, upon submission of a presidential report, and 40% could be dis-
bursed no earlier than February 15, 1987, subject to the receipt by Congress of a detailed
presidential report and a 15-day waiting period during which Congress could enact a joint
resolution of disapproval. Congress also added fast-track reviews of any joint resolution to
restrict the use of the funds to "humanitarian assistance," "logistics advice and assistance,"
and "support for democratic political and diplomatic activities," id. § 211 (f)(1)(B), 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at 1783-304 to -305, and of any joint resolution to
consider additional requests for aid. Id. § 215, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100
Stat.) at 1783-307. More recently, the President, anxious to secure funding for the eontras, has
proposed making disbursements conditioned not on his own reports but upon a "sense of Con-
gress" resolution. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
93. One member each was appointed by the House Speaker, the House Minority Leader
and the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders; one other member, the chairman, was ap-
pointed by majority -vote of the four appointed members. No member could be a government
officer or employee. The Commission members received per diem salaries and could appoint
seven paid staff members. Id. § 213, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at
1783-305 to 1783-306.
94. Id. § 213(b), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at 1783-305.
95. Id. § 213(e), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) at 1783-306. Thus,
the Commission was to provide, inter alia, a detailed statement on the status of negotiations
towards a peace settlement; a discussion of alleged human rights violations; and an evaluation
of the progress by the contras in broadening their political base and defining a program for
achieving representative democracy. Id. § 214(1), (3), (4), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (100 Stat.) at 1783-307.
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III. The Constitution and Foreign Assistance
Even though Congress possesses the bulk of textual foreign affairs
powers,96 the Executive has asserted authority to direct foreign assistance
policy based both on the text of the Constitution and on Supreme Court
precedent. Most notably, the Executive relies on Justice Sutherland's
dictum in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,97 proclaiming the
President to be the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations.
'98
Even though the courts have refrained from adjudicating separation of
powers challenges in foreign assistance,99 this section argues that Con-
gress retains ample constitutional authority to control foreign assistance.
Because foreign aid slips between the cracks of textually enumerated
constitutional grants of power, the separation of powers debate over for-
eign assistance funding hinges on relating the textual foreign affairs pow-
ers to the purposes served by foreign assistance. 100 Congress argues that
because all foreign assistance involves either an appropriation of money
96. The President's specifically enumerated foreign affairs powers include his authority as
"Commander in Chief," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I; his power "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," id. cl. 2; and his power to "appoint Ambassadors,"
id., and to "receive Ambassadors," id. art. II, § 3. More generally, the President possesses the
"executive Power," id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, and the mandate to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." Id. art. II, § 3.
Congress' specifically enumerated foreign affairs powers are far more numerous. Congress
has the power "to... provide for the common Defence," id. art. I, § 8, cl1; "[t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water," id. cl. 11; "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," id. cl. 3; "[t]o raise and
support Armies," id. cl. 12; "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," id. cl. 13; "[t]o make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id. cl. 14; "[t]o establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization," id. cl. 4; "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies on the
high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations," id. cl. 10; to regulate the value of "for-
eign Coin," id. cl. 5; "Etlo lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises," id. cl. 1; and to
"dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States," id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. More generally, Congress is
vested with the "legislative Powers," id. art. I, § 1, from which flow the power of appropria-
tions ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law," id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7) and the "necessary and proper" clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl.
18.
97. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
98. Id. at 319 (quoting John Marshall's March 7, 1800, argument before the House of
Representatives). Marshall's statement was quoted out of context. While the Executive tends
to cite the broad Curtiss- Wright dicta, the actual holding was much narrower, affirming the
President's power to declare an arms embargo pursuant to specific congressional authoriza-
tion. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rv. 1, 15-17,
26-33 (1972).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 109-116.
100. Not all constitutional analysis, of course, rests on sheer textual grounds. The mean-
ing of text is influenced by constitutional custom and precedent:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Consti-
tution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an
inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.
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or a trade of goods, its constitutional appropriation and foreign com-
merce powers confer upon Congress plenary control over foreign assist-
ance. The Executive has four responses. First, even if Congress' power
over appropriations and foreign commerce is plenary, Congress can only
exercise its authority through the legislative process, which grants the
President veto power. 10 1 Second, the President enjoys his own plenary
power to interpret and administer the law, giving him, in practice, discre-
tion to modify controversial policies. 10 2 Third, the President possesses
substantive plenary powers as the commander-in-chief,103 the treaty-
maker, 1°4 and the appointer and receiver of ambassadors. 10 5 Finally,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Thus, longstanding presidential practice accepted by Congress "may be treated as a gloss on
'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II." Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
Curtiss-Wright states that with regard to foreign affairs the text of the Constitution may
have no application at all: "The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only
in respect of our internal affairs." Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-16. This extra-constitu-
tional theory of foreign affairs, however, was never adopted in later Supreme Court eases. In
Youngstown, after President Truman had seized the nation's steel mills because of a work
stoppage during the Korean War, the Court stated, "The President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or the Constitution itself." 343 U.S. at 585.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
102. This argument is a cornerstone of the formalist theory of the separation of powers
promoted in Chadha and Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1985). In Bowsher, the court
stated, "As Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its
participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its enactment only indi-
rectly-by passing new legislation." Id. at 3192.
103. U.S. CONST art. II, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has stated that, "[w]hile Congress
cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can pro-
vide him an army or navy to command." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). "The Constitutional division of the war power between the President and the Congress
creates a spectrum in which those decisions that approach the tactical and managerial are for
the President, while the major questions of war or peace are, in the last analysis, confined to
the Congress." Comments on the Articles on the Legality of the United States Action in Cambo-
dia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 79, 80 (1971) (quoting comment by Robert H. Bork). It follows that
Congressional regulation of foreign assistance may infringe upon the President's tactical com-
mander-in-chief powers when the aid is intertwined with the involvement of the armed forces.
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland noted that,
notwithstanding the Senate's advice and consent role, the President "alone negotiates" and
"[i]nto the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it." 299 U.S. at 319. It follows that if Congress conditions foreign assistance on the
negotiation of a treaty, see, eg., ISDCA of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 722(k), 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 190, 256 (negotiation of Central American regional peace
treaty), such action burdens the President's plenary negotiation powers. Alternatively, a con-
gressional prohibition on foreign assistance may leave the President at the negotiating table
without any bargaining chips.
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 and § 3. A foreign assistance prohibition on aid to
countries with which the United States has no diplomatic relations, see 22 U.S.C. § 2370(t)
(1982), may burden the President's decision whether to negotiate with that country towards
the establishment of diplomatic relations.
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Congress' general power over appropriations does not permit it to
achieve ends beyond those that it could otherwise legislate under the
scope of its specific and enumerated powers.
10 6
Congress has four counterarguments. First, it may override any veto
by a two-thirds vote. Second, the President may not execute laws as he
chooses but is constitutionally bound to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."10 7 Third, the President's various functions, such as
that of commander-in-chief, do not positivistically create a policy-mak-
ing power akin to the legislative powers of Congress. 10 8 Finally, neither
the Constitution's text nor Congress' structural constitutional role as leg-
islative policy-maker implies a truncated appropriations power, one lim-
ited to specifying "how much" but not "how" funds shall be spent.
The judiciary has refrained from resolving this separation of powers
dispute, relying upon the political question and equitable discretion doc-
trines to avoid reaching the merits of challenges by members of Congress
to the Executive's management of foreign assistance. 10 9 In Crockett v.
Reagan,110 for example, twenty-nine members of Congress brought suit
against executive officials for failure to terminate assistance to El Salva-
dor in accordance with human rights legislation."' The District Court
106. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-15 (1946), the Supreme Court decided
that an appropriations bill that withheld funds to three particular government employees, who
were feared to be subversives, was no "mere appropriations measure," id. at 313, but was an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. "It seems clear that the availability of appropriations cannot
be conditioned on compliance with directions and prohibitions that Congress could not legis-
late directly." Wallace, supra note 4, at 324. The appropriations power is a blunt instrument,
which Congress may use by either appropriating or not, but not by attaching substantive re-
strictions and conditions that it could not otherwise legislate. Arguing that the "nuances" of
executive and legislative power are not informed by theories of separation of powers but by the
"continuing development of accommodations" between the two branches, Wallace concludes
that the President has exclusive "core" powers that "embrace the power both to conduct for-
eign affairs and make policy," id. at 309, 320, while Congress retains power at the peripheries
of foreign relations to regulate less important, miscellaneous areas such as immigration and
passports or to give up-or-down decisions on major questions of war and appropriations. Id.
at 321.
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
108. In the framework of the "Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his
function in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing
of laws he thinks bad." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
109. Citizens have also been denied judicial consideration of the merits of their claims
against the Executive's administration of foreign assistance. In Clark v. United States, 609 F.
Supp. 1249 (D. Md 1985), a Maryland district court dismissed on standing grounds a suit by
citizen taxpayers demanding a tax refund for foreign assistance funds provided to El Salvador
and to Nicaraguan rebel groups, allegedly in violation of human rights restrictions under 22
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
110. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
111. The claim challenged the truthfulness of presidential certifications of progress in
human rights in El Salvador under country-specific legislation, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) note (1982
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dismissed the claim, holding that even if presidential certifications of
human rights conditions were untruthful, the doctrine of equitable dis-
cretion counseled that relief be withheld when "the plaintiffs' dispute is
primarily with their fellow legislators" who had failed to vote for a reso-
lution to terminate aid. 112 In 1983, in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 113 a
group of Congressmen challenged U.S. activity in Nicaragua as a viola-
tion of the Boland Amendment.114 The District Court dismissed the
claim on the basis of the equitable discretion and the political question
doctrines. 115 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia dis-
missed the Boland Amendment claim as moot, since the appropriations
bill of which it had been a part had expired by the time of the appellate
hearing. 116
Although clouded by the debate over who has absolute control over
foreign assistance, relative peaks of congressional power can be discerned
within the landscape of foreign aid. Congressional power over foreign
& Supp. III 1985), see supra note 61, as well as the President's continued provision of assist-
ance without certification of "exceptional circumstances" permitting him to waive the provi-
sion, under the general prohibition of assistance to human rights violating countries, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
112. The District Court justified the equitable discretion doctrine, reasoning that
[w]hen a member of Congress is a plaintiff in a lawsuit, concern about separation of pow-
ers counsels judicial restraint even where a private plaintiff may be entitled to relief.
Where the plaintiff's dispute appears to be primarily with his fellow legislators, "[]udges
are presented not with a chance to mediate between two political branches but rather with
the possibility of thwarting Congress's will by allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the
processes of democratic decisionmaking."
558 F. Supp. at 902 (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same grounds. It
also affirmed the District Court's finding that the issue of whether the President must file a
report pursuant to the War Powers Resolution was a nonjusticiable political question.
113. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
114. 568 F. Supp. at 600. The Boland Amendment in question was contained in the Fur-
ther Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865
(1982). The Congressmen also claimed violations of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-148, § 7, 87 Stat. 555, 557-58; the Neutrality Act, Pub. L. No. 60-350, 35 Stat. 1090;
the National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495; and the intelligence
activity reporting requirements of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Intelligence Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981-82
(1980).
115. 568 F. Supp. at 600.
116. 770 F.2d at 210. The court failed to acknowledge that a new Boland prohibition had
been enacted in 1984. It heard oral argument on May 24, 1984, but did not decide the case
until August 13, 1985. Meanwhile, Congress had passed another Boland Amendment taking
effect on October 12, 1984, for fiscal year 1985. Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 8066(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837, 1935; see supra
note 86 and accompanying text. Less than a week before the decision, on August 8, 1985,
Congress permitted humanitarian assistance to the contras for fiscal year 1986 but continued to
bar funds for military activities of the type alleged in the complaint. ISDCA of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-83, § 722(k), 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 190, 249-59; see supra
note 89 and accompanying text.
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assistance is greater than the President's in four of the six types of foreign
assistance discussed above: 117 all three forms of economic development
and humanitarian assistance (loans or grants, governmental sales, private
commercial transfers), and private commercial regulation of military
transfers.'" 8 This conclusion stems from a comparison of the President's
and Congress' enumerated powers. The President's strongest foreign af-
fairs power, as commander-in-chief, does not extend uniformly over the
entire spectrum of foreign assistance. It has less force in economic devel-
opment assistance than in military assistance. Even for military assist-
ance, the President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy"
and not of the makers and merchants of military arms.1 19 Congress' au-
thority rests not only on foreign commerce and appropriations powers,
but also on lesser known textually enumerated foreign affairs powers.
For example, Congress may restrict aid to nations seizing U.S. fishing
vessels, 120 by virtue of its power "to define and punish Piracies commit-
ted on the high Seas;"' 12 1 to terrorist nations122 or human rights viola-
tors, 123 by virtue of its power "to define and punish... Offenses against
the Law of Nations;"' 24 and to countries that permit mob destruction of
U.S. government property, 125 by virtue of its power "to make all needful
117. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
118. In the other two types of foreign assistance-military loans or grants, and military
sales-the President and Congress share power equally.
119. "Even though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness
to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the
ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes
from stopping production." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. Thus, while the President's role as
chief of the armed forces may permit him to sell or give away U.S.-owned military equipment,
it does not logically extend to regulating private commercial sales. "There are indications that
the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
will constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabit-
ants." 343 U.S. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
120. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(o) (1982). This would also empower Congress in the area of terror-
ist acts committed in international waters or airspace.
121. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 10.
122. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2371(a) (Supp. III 1985) (prohibiting assistance under the For-
eign Assistance Act, the Agricultural Trade and Development and Assistance Act of 1954, the
Peace Corps Act, the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and the Arms Export Control Act to
countries supporting terrorism); 22 U.S.C. § 2753(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985) (terminating military
sales to countries granting sanctuary to international terrorists). For a list of other terrorism
restrictions, see Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism through
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 169, 177 nn.30, 31 (1987).
123. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (economic development assistance to
human rights violators), discussed supra note 49; 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(security assistance to human rights violators), discussed supra notes 50-56 and accompanying
text.
124. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
125. 22 U.S.C. § 23700) (1982).
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Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States."
126
In light of the above, Congress appears to be underexercising its pow-
ers over foreign assistance, delegating to the Executive much of what it
constitutionally could control. With the courts continuing to step aside,
however, this struggle will remain largely political and not legal. The
challenge before Congress, then, is to draw on the political legitimacy of
its constitutional role in order to expand its institutional capacity to com-
pete with and control executive action.
IV. Effectiveness of Current Congressional Controls
Congress has no way to quantify the effect of the controls it has im-
posed upon executive discretion. This section nevertheless offers a theo-
retical framework for Congress to gauge how effective a given control
will be. It reviews the different controls that Congress has developed and
shows how they serve the twin procedural goals of slowing executive ac-
tion and quickening congressional reaction. It argues that Congress ulti-
mately "controls" executive action only to the extent that it retains a
reactive ability to reverse, or to threaten to reverse, actions with which it
disagrees. In this light, fast-track review procedures emerge as the most
effective form of congressional control. The effectiveness of all other con-
trols largely depends on the efficacy of the fast-track. Fast-track proce-
dures, moreover, stand out as more effective than the legislative veto.
Chadha, ironically, may have increased congressional control of foreign
assistance by prompting a conversion to and reliance on fast-track con-
trol devices.
A. Review of Congressional Controls
The current state of the art statutory control device employed by Con-
gress restricts executive discretion in two ways. First, it imposes a proce-
dure upon executive action. Prior to taking discretionary action, the
Executive must: adhere to increasingly complex and objective defini-
tional standards; report all available information and provide highly de-
tailed policy justifications; consider certain outside standards and
factors;1 27 and initiate in-person consultations with members of Con-
gress. Second, it lowers procedural barriers to congressional review.
Congress' power to review an action benefits from: shortened authoriza-
tion periods that encourage more frequent congressional attention to ex-
126. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
127. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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ecutive action; report-and-wait requirements that prevent the Executive
from presenting Congress with faits accomplis; independent fact-finding
sources that compete with executive sources of information; and fast-
track procedures that ensure an up-or-down vote on any executive
action. 128
B. The Meaning of "Control"
Whether Congress has strengthened its control through these devices
depends largely on how "control" is defined. To control does not mean
"to manage." Congress is not an executive enforcement body; it has the
power to prescribe processes, not to carry them out. Congress lacks not
only the institutional competence to micro-manage foreign assistance,
but also the constitutional authority to participate in day-to-day deci-
sion-making except through actions taken bicamerally and presented to
the President.1
29
Neither can "control" mean ensuring that the President carries out the
precise will and intent of Congress. Often the goals of Congress' foreign
aid restrictions are only vaguely expressed in a legislative preamble.
Sometimes legislation reveals logically inconsistent intent or conflicting
policy goals.1 30 Finally, many foreign aid restrictions, in the interests of
128. In Chadha, Chief Justice Burger mentioned some of these controls, noting that even
in the absence of the legislative veto Congress has "abundant means to oversee and control its
administrative creatures." 462 U.S. at 955 n.19. The control devices mentioned at various
points in the opinion include formal reporting requirements, report-and-wait (or pre-notifica-
tion) requirements, durational limits on authorizations, definitional limits of authorizing legis-
lation, and judicial review. Id. at 953 n.16, 955 n.19.
129. For these reasons, the Iran-Contra affair was not a failure of Congress to "control"
foreign assistance. The majority report of the committees on the Iran-Contra affair declared,
"It is the conclusion of these Committees that the Iran-Contra Affair resulted from the failure
of individuals to observe the law, not from deficiencies in existing law or in our system of
governance.... Congress cannot legislate good judgment, honesty, or fidelity to law." U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANS-
ACTIONS WITH IRAN AND U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SECRET MILITARY ASSIST-
ANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H. REP. No. 433 and S. REP. No.
216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 423 (1987). The shipment of arms to Iran and the diversion of
funds to the contras violated the substantive prohibitions on arms sales to terrorist nations and
assistance for military activities in Nicaragua. Even if the sales and assistance were somehow
to fall outside of the definitional limits of the statutory prohibitions, the Executive was, at the
very least, required to notify and report on such transfers. The legal structure was there; it was
clearly flouted. See Scheffer, U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 696
(1987). Ironically, the increase in congressional controls may well account for the "off-the-
books" nature of the National Security Council operation.
130. The policy on assistance to Pakistan, for example, has been torn between the goals of
withholding assistance to discourage the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons and
providing assistance to promote political stability and Pakistani efforts to assist the Afghan
rebels. In 1985, Congress prohibited assistance to Pakistan unless the President certified that
"the assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear
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permitting flexibility, leave Congress' intent open-ended, by, for example,
granting the President broad waiver authority on the basis of his individ-
ual and unchecked findings of a "national security interest."'' 31 The diffi-
culty of determining congressional intent is compounded by the varying
and undefined language used to describe the national security interest:
"vital to the security of the United States," "national interests," and "in
the security interests."' 132 A meaningful definition of "control," then, is
not the power to manage foreign aid distribution or to compel the Presi-
dent to divine the intent of Congress. Rather, the power to control presi-
dential discretion is ultimately the power to review: both to set general
policy guidelines and to disapprove particular presidential actions as in-
consistent with those guidelines. A congressional control device is effec-
tive to the extent that it strengthens and streamlines Congress'
institutional power of review.
The cornerstone of congressional "control" over foreign assistance is
the fast-track procedure. Other control devices, by themselves, do not
permit Congress to review and reverse an act of presidential discretion.
Reporting requirements are less likely to be observed without the threat
that Congress will vote to disapprove the Executive's policy. Consulta-
tion requirements degenerate into de facto notification requirements if
Congress is unable to review. Shortened authorization periods mean lit-
tle if Congress is unable at each juncture to change the policy and the
boundaries of executive discretion. These controls, standing alone, fail to
constrain an Executive pursuing goals contrary to those of Congress. 133
explosive device." ISDCA of 1985, § 902(e), 99 Stat. at 267-68 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2375(e) (Supp. III 1985)). The purpose of prohibiting aid was to limit the flow of military
technology and foreign exchange with which to purchase critical nuclear materials. Requiring
the President to certify that aid would "reduce significantly" Pakistani efforts to acquire or
develop a nuclear device invited the President to stretch the truth in order to promote the
alternative short-term goal of regional political stability. See infra note 148.
131. See supra note 17.
13 2. The vagueness and seeming interchangeability of these terms may make their use
constitutionally questionable under the nondelegation doctrine. This doctrine embodies the
notion that "[flormulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility entrusted to it by
the electorate." U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). However,
an attack on nondelegation grounds is not likely to succeed under the wide delegation stan-
dards allowed by the Supreme Court, especially in the context of foreign affairs. See Goldwa-
ter v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.l (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S.
304 (upholding delegation to President of power to ban arms sales to certain countries if he felt
it would serve cause of regional peace); Note, Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: Defin-
ing a Restricted Legislative Veto, 94 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500 (1985).
133. In the human rights context, for example, the Executive has twisted the meaning of
the definitional limits. See Cohen, supra note 5. Reporting requirements have been frustrated
by inaccurate and biased reporting. See Albert, supra note 5, at 244. And executive certifica-
tions, required in order for the Executive to waive prohibitions, have not always been truthful.
See infra note 148.
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C. The Legislative Veto and the Fast-Track
The various legislative vetoes in foreign assistance legislation had lim-
ited value in controlling executive discretion over foreign assistance.
Notwithstanding the broad legislative veto in place since 1961,134 as well
as numerous other vetoes enacted later, few resolutions of disapproval
were introduced and none ever passed.135 Failure to exercise the legisla-
tive veto demonstrates that the central obstacle to Congress asserting
control over foreign assistance has not been the President, but Congress
itself. The barrier is not, as presumed by proponents of the legislative
veto, Congress' inability to muster a two-thirds supermajority on a floor
vote to disapprove presidential action, but its inability to muster the
political will to vote on a controversial measure at all. 136 Only twice
since 1978 has Congress passed a regular foreign aid authorization and
appropriations bill (in 1981 and 1985). By contrast, between 1961 and
1978, only once-in 1972-did Congress fail to do So. 137 Congress has
resorted to legislating foreign assistance through continuing resolutions
and supplemental appropriations. 138
134. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
135. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 1983, at 141 (Comm. Print 1984). The concurrent resolution legislative veto
also had "threat" value. Concurrent resolutions were introduced in 1976 against the sale of
Hawk and Vulcan air defense system to Jordan; in 1977 against AWACs to Iran; in 1978
against aircraft sales to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia; and in 1981 against AWACs and F-15
parts to Saudi Arabia. The introduction of these measures and their near success did persuade
the President to modify the terms and content of the deals.
The legislative veto may have been as much a political instrument as a binding legal instru-
ment. Congress passed legislative veto provisions even after Chadha. In 1985, for example,
§ 514 of the Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837, 1898, enacted
the pariah of legislative vetoes-the committee veto-prohibiting transfers between foreign
assistance appropriation accounts without prior written approval of both appropriations com-
mittees. More recently, the President has revived the concurrent resolution legislative veto by
proposing, as an incentive for Congress to vote funds for the contras, that disbursements of
assistance be conditioned upon a "sense of Congress" resolution. NY Times, Feb. 3, 1988, at
Al, col. 6. This may permit an unconstitutional intrusion by Congress into the Executive's
interpretation of the law, according to the principles of Bowsher.
136. Even on those occasions when Congress had the political will to terminate assistance
to a country, it sidestepped the option of a concurrent resolution in favor of a joint resolution
country-specific prohibition. One reason for the rejection of the concurrent resolution process
might have been its lack of political legitimacy in light of questions about its constitutionality.
Another might have been that the country-specific prohibitions that were enacted, unlike blan-
ket "vetoes," could be tailored to each situation.
137. HousE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 1984, at 70, 73 (Comm. Print 1985).
138. Id. at 70. This practice has infected all of Congress' legislation; an example is the
$600 billion appropriations package passed in December 1987. See A Crazy Way to Govern,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1987, at A26 (editorial). The continuing resolution and supplemental
appropriations processes are, due to their sheer size and diversity, a means of promoting semi-
expedited legislative consideration. For example, in 1981, when a regular foreign aid appropri-
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In contrast to the legislative veto, fast-track procedures virtually com-
pel congressional review of presidential discretion. For an institutionally
clumsy Congress that cannot reach decisions on foreign assistance, fast-
track review procedures offer an effective way to rein in a decisive Execu-
tive Branch. Fast-track procedures are particularly suited for the review
of executive action which requires an up-or-down, yes-or-no type of
decision. 139
Critics of the fast-track procedures point out that they do not bind
Congress. Because fast-track procedures are formulated outside the stat-
utory process, as a part of the internal rules of each House, they offer the
advantage of being instituted easily without presentment to the Presi-
dent, but they can also be readily changed through the parliamentary
procedures of each House.140 The House of Representatives has already
eroded the fast-track procedures in considering aid for the contras in the
ations bill was passed, the House spent more time in debate-four hours-and considered
more changes-six amendments-than it would in the next three years combined when foreign
aid was just a small part of large appropriation packages. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
1984, supra note 137, at 76-78. Furthermore, the process centralizes decision-making power in
the hands of a few House and Senate conferees. The full membership of the appropriations
committees does not consider an entire resolution; rather, the committees break up into mini-
conferences to consider separate sections of each bill. Only four people-the chairpersons and
minority leaders of the Foreign Operations Subcommittees-participate in the miniconference.
Id. at 78-79.
139. The initiation and enactment of new legislation, on the other hand, demands greater
opportunities for amendments, consideration, and debate, and may thus be hampered by expe-
dited procedures.
The effectiveness of fast-track procedures can be seen in the trade area, where Congress has
used the fast-track to enhance notification and consultation procedures. The "modified fast-
track" procedures employed in the Trade and TariffAct of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 401(a),
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2948, 3013-14, require that the President,
upon a request from another country for free trade negotiations, consult with the House Ways
and Means Committees and with the Senate Finance Committee for 60 days before giving an
additional 90-day notice of his intent to sign an agreement. If either committee disapproves of
the negotiations during the 60-day consultation period, or if the President fails to notify Con-
gress 90 days prior to concluding an agreement, then the agreement can be bumped from the
"fast track" onto the "slow track"-the regular legislative process-where there is little assur-
ance that it will survive intact. Thus, the guarantee of fast-track consideration is a major
incentive for foreign countries to negotiate seriously with U.S. presidents.
The foreign assistance process is, of course, quite different. Our "negotiating partners" re-
quire no incentives to discuss the aid they need.
140. The House Rules Committee has expressed concern that, notwithstanding Congress'
constitutional power to regulate its internal proceedings, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, the
inclusion of internal House rules within the text of a statute waives the House's unilateral right
to change them.
To the extent that the House chooses to enact any rule into law, it places itself in the
constitutionally unacceptable position of requiring the consent of the other body and of
the President to directly modify or repeal that rule .... [T]he committee believes that
unnecessary doubts are invited by proposing rules in statutory form.
H. REP. No. 257, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
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last two years.141 Yet, other forms of congressional review, such as the
legislative veto, are also subject to abuse by parliamentary procedures.
The fast-track procedures offer a way to prevent resolutions from being
side-tracked by other forms of parliamentary maneuvering. 142 They re-
main Congress' most viable option for strengthening its power to control
executive discretion.
V. Strengthening Congressional Controls
As the two preceding sections illustrate, the challenge before Congress
is to control executive discretion in ways that are not only constitutional
but effective. This section suggests three ways to strengthen existing con-
trol devices. It then proposes the creation of a legislative-executive com-
mittee to improve Congress' own institutional competence to fashion
foreign assistance policy, thus eliminating the necessity of entrusting the
Executive with wide-ranging discretion.
141. On April 16, 1986, the House met to consider a resolution to approve additional
assistance to the contras under the statutorily declared expedited process. See supra note 90
and accompanying text. Representative Trent Lott rose to object to consideration of the reso-
lution because it had not been introduced as required within three days of the President's
request for more aid. In response, House Speaker "Tip" O'Neill declared that the resolution
was not being brought up under the statute at all, but under a separate House rule newly
reported from the Rules Committee providing fast-track consideration. O'Neill stated, "The
House is not operating under that statute, and that statute does acknowledge that the House
has the constitutional right to change the procedure at any time under its rulemaking author-
ity. The Committee on Rules and the House have changed the procedure .. " 132 CONG.
Rc. H1848 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1986). In this case, the President received fast-track considera-
tion, but the statute had been circumvented.
The fast-track was derailed again in March 1987. As the House was about to vote on the
resolution of disapproval for the third installment of contra aid, see supra note 92 and accom-
panying text, House Speaker James Wright recognized a member of the Rules Committee
seeking to introduce a measure changing the resolution from one of up-or-down approval to
one proposing a moratorium on further aid pending an accounting of previous contra aid.
Representatives Robert Michel and Lott, seeking to introduce the simple statutory resolution
of disapproval, protested the Speaker's recognition of anyone else in light of the "highly privi-
leged" nature of their resolution. Speaker Wright responded that a resolution reported by the
Rules Committee was equally priviliged, and that he was authorized as Speaker to exercise his
discretion in choosing between consideration of two highly privileged motions. 133 CONG.
REC. Hi 189-90 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987). Representative Lott responded:
Mr. Speaker, what in heaven's name is going on around this House that we can't abide by
our own rules and process we established, by law, just 5 months ago, for dealing with this
issue? ... The only way prescribed by that law that the aid could not be released would
be by the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. But now the Democratic leader-
ship wants to change the rules in the middle of the game, change the funding terms in the
middle of the fiscal year, and impose more conditions, terms and delays in the funds'
release.
Id. at Hl191.
142. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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A. Proposed New Control Devices
There are at least three ways that Congress can enhance its current
controls over executive discretion. The first is to match objective defini-
tional standards in statutory language 43 with congressionally appointed
shadow fact-finding commissions. 144 No existing control combines these
two innovations. 145 This two-pronged approach corners executive dis-
cretion by simultaneously closing off the two avenues that the Executive
has to escape a statutory limit: its internal interpretation of the limit and
its external findings of conformity with that limit. Explicitly combining
these two types of control would allow Congress to rely upon two fact-
finding bodies making competing evaluations against one fixed, objective
standard, rather than depending upon one official fact-finder trying to
mold its facts to a floating, subjective standard.
Although it would not be feasible for Congress to define all statutory
restrictions in objective terms or to demand independent fact-finding ver-
ification in all cases, some restrictions could be greatly strengthened
143. Objective standards can be created by reference to either numerical quantities or spe-
cifically enumerated instances. Examples of the former include drug production measures in
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 22 U.S.C. §2291 (Supp. III 1985), or precise food-aid quotas to
countries meeting statistical poverty criteria set by the International Development Association,
7 U.S.C.A. § 1711 (West Supp. 1987). The prohibition on assistance to countries that,
through their voting practices at the United Nations, evince a "consistent pattern of opposition
to the foreign policy of the United States," 22 U.S.C. § 2414a(b) (Supp. III 1985), lends itself
to a numerical standard based on how often a foreign country votes in opposition to the United
States. Similarly, the prohibition on assistance to countries that have repudiated a debt owed
to a U.S. citizen, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c) (1982), could be given teeth by setting a dollar amount
that would trigger the aid cut-off.
An example of a standard cast in terms of enumerated instances can be found in the human
rights-based restrictions on foreign assistance. That legislation defines "gross violations of in-
ternationally recognized human rights" to include "torture," "prolonged detention without
charges and trial," and "causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandes-
tine detention of those persons." 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1) (1982). Instances could be enumer-
ated for the prohibition of aid to countries in "substantial violation" of arms transfer
agreements, 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d)(1) (1982), to include specific examples of violations.
These two types of objective standards are not flawless. Choosing a numerical standard is
inevitably arbitrary. Enumerated-instance standards present the joint problems of trying to
define the "instances" provided (e.g. "prolonged detention") and attempting to list all possible
instances in which the prohibition would apply.
144. These shadow fact-finding bodies could take the form either of ad hoc appointed com-
mittees or of a permanent Congressional Office of Foreign Assistance. This office would be
similar in function to the Congressional Budget Office, which monitors and checks the Execu-
tive's budget calculations. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS
244-45 (1979).
145. Objective definitional standards are used in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-570, § 2005, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3207-1, 3207-61,
see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text, while a shadow fact-finding committee is em-
ployed in the 1986 appropriation bill for the Nicaraguan contras, Pub. L. No. 99-500, §§ 206-
216, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1783, 1783-299 to -308, see supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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along these two lines. A statute imposing human rights restrictions on
foreign aid, for example, could specify a minimum number of people or
percentage of the population victimized by physical violence or political
imprisonment as constituting a sanctionable violation.146 The Executive
and the shadow fact-finding commission could devote their efforts to
investigating ascertainable figures rather than speculating about the
meaning of a "consistent pattern" or "gross violations." Although the
shadow commission could not compel the Executive to accept its find-
ings,' 47 its official status would act as a constraining political influence on
executive fact-finding. The combination of objective standards and
shadow fact-finding would help refocus the policy debate. A President
who opposed restrictions would not be able to achieve his objective
through reinterpretation of standards or questionable fact-finding, but in-
stead would be forced to exercise his waiver power. Thus, the policy
debate would no longer turn upon whether certain barbarous govern-
ments fall outside of the definitional application of the prohibitions, but
upon the broader policy question of whether it is in the national interest
to provide foreign assistance despite the foreign government's conduct. 148
A second way for Congress to strengthen its control is to reactivate its
advice-and-consent power to promote increased consultation by execu-
tive officers.' 49 Congress currently relies on statutorily prescribed proce-
dures for in-person consultation. These procedures are, however, an
inappropriate instrument for promoting meaningful communication be-
tween the Executive and Congress. Effective consultation is an ongoing
informal give-and-take process, the need for which arises independent of
statutory timetables. 150 In addition, because Congress cannot constitu-
tionally compel the Executive to accept the advice of individual mem-
bers, inserting detailed consultation provisions within every assistance
146. A numerical standard would be more easily and accurately set in country-specific
legislation than in general legislation applying to all countries. Existing country-specific legis-
lation has, however, failed to adopt objective standards.
147. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
148. For example, with aid to El Salvador in the early 1980s, Congress put the President in
the position of reconciling inconsistent policies of anti-communism and human rights by mak-
ing him certify as a condition of providing assistance that the Salvadoran government had
made progress in promoting human rights. Representative Lee Hamilton noted, "In the El
Salvador situation, we were asking the President to certify the uncertifiable ... knowing that
the President would do so. It distorted the whole debate." N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at A12,
col. 3.
149. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
advise and consent on the appointment of officers of the United States. Congress retains this
power over all officers except those "inferior" officers whom it allows the other branches to
appoint without congressional approval.
150. The in-person consultation provisions in 22 U.S.C. § 2291(f) (Supp. III 1985), for
example, are triggered only upon submission of the President's periodic reports.
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restriction may impose an unnecessarily cumbersome process without
providing Congress much benefit. Congress therefore should not de-
mand consultation, but rather entice it, by conditioning consent to the
appointment of executive officers involved in foreign assistance on those
officers' agreement to participate in a cooperative, information-sharing
relationship with appropriate committees of Congress. 151 Even though
Congress would have no way of ensuring that confirmed officers fulfill
their promises to establish a continuing relationship, this would be an
improvement over current statutory consultation procedures, which
mandate little more than that meetings and discussions take place.'5 2
Finally, Congress can improve its fast-track procedures by raising the
cost to itself of not adhering to them. Current fast-track procedures are
too easily circumvented to provide adequate guarantees that Congress
will review executive action. If the President were permitted to invoke
his special funds authority to continue assistance should Congress not
give prompt consideration to a resolution of approval, Congress would
have a strong incentive to adhere to fast-track procedures and make a
decision. In the context of assistance to the Nicaraguan contras, for ex-
ample, Congress could require a fast-track resolution of approval at
ninety-day intervals to permit the next disbursement of funds. In the
event that opponents of renewed assistance derailed the fast track,
preventing consideration within ten calendar days, the President would
be entitled to invoke his special funds authority,15 3 in an amount no more
than that which would have been permitted, to continue assistance.
54
151. Because Congress has the power to decide which officers are subject to its advice and
consent and which officers are not, it can also increase the number of officers subject to its
consent.
152. Each committee already retains, through the subpoena power, independent authority
to mandate that meetings and discussions take place.
153. This is analogous to one of the recurring debates over the War Powers Resolution.
Congress in effect "authorizes" the President to commit U.S. forces for 60 days by mandating
withdrawal after 60 days (or 90 days if the President requests an extension) if Congress does
not give affirmative approval. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1982).
Some argue that the mandatory withdrawal provision is a legislative veto because it can be
triggered without Congress taking any action. According to this argument, Congress, by not
acting, has the effect of "altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons ... outside
the Legislative Branch", Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952, without bicameral passage and presentment
to the President. On the other hand, if the War Powers Resolution does not expressly delegate
authority to the President to commit U.S. forces, then requiring that U.S. forces be withdrawn
does not "alter" any legal rights or duties. Moreover, were the prohibited legislative veto to be
defined broadly enough to include inaction under the War Powers Resolution, this would pre-
clude Congress from setting any time limits at all on authorizations, whether 60 days or the
more customary one to two years. By this standard, every time Congress authorized actions or
appropriated funds, it could only stop further actions through a joint resolution of disapproval,
subject to presidential veto.
154. A problem would arise for this approach if the prospective authorization was larger
than the amount in the pools of the President's independent authorities. The President cur-
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Thus Congress, though not absolutely binding itself to take action,
would, in effect, guarantee the President either an up-or-down vote or
continuance of his assistance program. 155 Perhaps the major disadvan-
tage to this new control is that the required congressional action would
occupy a great deal of time, to the detriment of other legislative matters.
This type of control, therefore, should be reserved for only the most sen-
sitive and contentious areas of foreign assistance funding.
B. Eliminating Executive Discretion: A Proposal for a Legislative-
Executive Committee on Foreign Assistance
As discussed earlier, 156 Congress has significant, though not unfet-
tered, constitutional authority to make foreign assistance policy. Ideally,
then, Congress should exert its authority over important "policy" deci-
sions in this field and leave less important "administrative details" to the
Executive. 157 Yet, with few exceptions, Congress does not currently de-
cide even such basic policy issues as how much and what type of assist-
ance to give each recipient country.158 Congress has, because of its
inefficient decision-making process, allowed the President to fill the pol-
icy vacuum and make many important decisions on foreign assistance.
159
In this light, congressional control devices have been part of a reactive
strategy to slow the actions of a decisive Executive, and have not served
as an appropriate substitute for congressional policy-making. To become
rently can tap $350 million of special funds and can extend credits for an additional $750
million in arms sales. 22 U.S.C. § 2364(a)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
155. This system would be similar to subjecting executive action to a vote of disapproval,
as provided in the Nicaraguan contra aid legislation, because congressional inaction would
result in continued aid. However, there are two critical differences. Under the proposed con-
trol device, Congress would have created the political expectation that it would vote on
whether to approve. And further, the President would face the politically less desirable alter-
native of relying on his independent authorities.
156. See supra notes 96-126 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 132. "Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility,
entrusted to it by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefi-
nite standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable
or responsive in the same degree to the people." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276
(1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Congress generally appropriates in non-country-specific lump-sums by category of
assistance. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. Many restrictions Congress imposes
are rendered "toothless" because the Executive is granted broad waiver authority. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. A sense that Congress was not com-
petent in foreign affairs may also have accounted at one time for wide delegations of authority
to the Executive Branch. The days have long passed, however, when Congress relied entirely
on the Executive Branch for information. With the increase in personal staffs and the expan-
sion of centralized congressional information agencies, many members of Congress have be-
come experts on a par with their Executive Branch counterparts. T. FRANCK & E.
WEISBAND, supra note 144, at 227, 242-43.
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a policy-maker, Congress need not invent more clever statutory controls,
but must reform its own decision-making process.
160
One way for Congress to exert primary decision-making power is to
create a joint legislative-executive committee charged with formulating
and proposing foreign assistance policy. The remainder of this section
argues that such a committee would be politically feasible and constitu-
tionally permissible, and would assert Congress' constitutional role in the
foreign assistance policy-making process. The Committee could respond
to two major impediments to congressional control of foreign assistance:
(1) the lack of efficient decision-making procedures; and (2) the lack of
incentives for executive consultation.
1. The Effectiveness of a Legislative-Executive Committee
The composition of the Committee should reflect a careful political
balance between members of different parties and branches of the govern-
ment. The Committee would have fifteen members: four from the ma-
jority and two from the minority in each House and an Assistant
Secretary from each of the Departments of State, Commerce, and De-
fense. 161 Of the six members from each House, the chairpersons of the
committees on Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations and Appropriations
would automatically be members and the remaining four members would
be chosen, two each, by the majority and minority leadership. The Com-
mittee members from Congress would reflect the views of the leadership
so that their actions would have greater weight among other members of
Congress. The Committee's party balance would be determined by that
of Congress, even if the President was from the other party. 162 Members
160. As Senator Charles Mathias observed:
If Congress is to be constructive in its foreign policy interventions in the future, not only
attitudes but institutions will have to change. Perhaps the single most effective action that
could be taken would be to establish some sort of coordinating mechanism to bring to-
gether the work of several committees with jurisdiction into a unified foreign policy
framework.
126 CONG. REc. S13909 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION: STRENGTHENING THE LEGISLATIVE
SIDE, REPORTPREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SEsS. 26 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION].
161. In this way, the Committee's composition would be patterned on that of the Helsinki
Commission, a joint legislative-executive human rights investigating committee formed by
Congress in 1976. Act to Establish a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Pub. L. No. 94-304, 90 Stat. 661-62 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 3000-3008 (West 1979
& Supp. 1987)).
162. For example, if the President were Republican and both Houses of Congress were
controlled by the Democrats, then the Democrats would still retain an 8-7 majority. If one
House of Congress and the President were of the same party, then that party would have a 9-6
majority. If the President and both Houses were from the same party, that party would have
an 11-4 majority.
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of Congress would retain an overwhelming twelve-to-three majority over
representatives of the Executive.
The Committee would serve as the linchpin for a new foreign assist-
ance policy-making process to replace the traditional decentralized au-
thorizations-appropriations process and the newer continuing resolution-
supplemental appropriations process. Traditionally, foreign aid legisla-
tion was controlled directly by the committees on authorizations, appro-
priations, and the budget, as well as indirectly by a total of twelve
committees in each House that dealt in one way or another with foreign
aid issues. 163 The result of involving so many actors in the process was
the proliferation of amendments that impeded legislative passage.
164
Under the newer continuing resolution-supplemental appropriations pro-
cess, Congress has reduced the number of controversial amendments, but
at the cost of depriving foreign aid legislation of a careful, well-structured
committee consideration process. Foreign assistance provisions appear
directly in large spending bills, not only without examination in commit-
tee but also without deliberation on the floor of Congress because many
members approve or disapprove such large package measures for reasons
unrelated to their foreign assistance content. The result of either the
traditional or more recent legislative consideration process is that the Ex-
ecutive dominates the early stages of recommending action and recon-
ciling executive and congressional views, because only the Executive has
a unified vision and program for foreign assistance.
The proposed Committee would strengthen Congress' voice by gener-
ating competing recommendations and a coherent, unified response to
programs proposed by the President. The Committee would function as
a standing committee of Congress, possessing full and exclusive oversight
and reporting powers over foreign assistance legislation. It would exceed
the scope of other standing committees because it would consider appro-
priations as well as authorizations of foreign assistance. This would
guard against the frequent practice of including authorization language
within appropriations bills. 165 Its bills would be reported simultaneously
to both Houses of Congress. Reported legislation would receive privi-
leged calendar status for consideration before both Houses. Members of
Congress could propose amendments, but strict limits on time for debate
would, in effect, limit the number of amendments that could be offered,
making any measure less likely to sink under its own amended weight.
163. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 160, at 18.
164. "The growing tendency of Congress to encumber foreign aid bills with all sorts of
restrictions and provisos has caused the legislation to stall in recent years." Roberts, Congress
Has its Ways of Influencing Foreign Aid, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1985, § 4, at p. 4, col. 3.
165. See Fisher, The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and
Informal Practices, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 51, 68-69 (1979).
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Once a measure passed both Houses, the Committee would serve as its
own conference committee. All measures passing both Houses would be
submitted to the President for signature.
This process would strike a balance between effective decision-making
and constitutional procedure. It would consolidate and expedite internal
congressional decision-making, endowing Congress with the institutional
agility and flexibility to formulate rapid changes in policy.' 66 Yet, the
process would remain within constitutional guidelines for legislative ac-
tion. The Committee would not usurp executive functions of interpreting
or administering the law. Furthermore, the entire process would satisfy,
through bicameral passage and presentment to the President, the consti-
tutional requirement, reiterated in Chadha, of a "single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure." 167
Besides enhancing Congress' internal decision-making powers, the
Committee could increase Congress' external leverage over the Executive
in formulating foreign assistance policy. The Committee would provide
a single, deliberative fact-finding forum whose recommendations would
carry substantial political weight with the public by virtue of its diverse
and high-level membership. The presence of executive branch members
on the same side of the table with their legislative counterparts would
promote a cooperative legislative-executive environment to replace the
current atmosphere of confrontation. Although the presence of three ex-
ecutive branch members would cede some power to the Executive, on
balance Congress would gain far more than it lost by eliminating execu-
tive discretion to waive restrictions or invoke independent authorities. In
the absence of these unilateral discretionary powers, the Executive would
be accountable to, and encouraged to cooperate with, the Committee in
the promotion of its foreign policy initiatives. Executive branch commit-
tee members would therefore have great incentive to participate actively
in the Committee by exercising their voting power. In addition, execu-
tive branch members would actively consult and openly exchange infor-
mation with other members in the hope of influencing votes.
2. The Political Feasibility of Creating a Legislative-Executive
Committee
At first glance, the creation of a legislative-executive committee on for-
eign assistance appears politically unrealistic, if not outright impossible.
166. The Committee would not necessarily hinder the President's ability to respond to
sudden emergencies. The President would still retain such independent powers as the
drawdown authority under 22 U.S.C. § 2318 (1982) and the "special" fund authority under 22
U.S.C. § 2364 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
167. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). See infra notes 176-81 and accompany-
ing text.
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In a Congress where members jealously guard their "turf" and where the
traditional committee process runs strong, few would appear likely to
agree to such an overwhelming centralization of power in such a novel
form. Yet closer examination reveals that many members of Congress
have already lost their influence in foreign assistance policy, and that
Congress has often and successfully innovated new committee structures
in response to unusual policy needs.
With the breakdown of the traditional authorizations-appropriations
process, 168 most members of Congress have already been left out of the
process by which foreign aid is legislated. 169 Because foreign aid meas-
ures have been wrapped up in large-package appropriations bills, and
considered under expedited procedures and great time pressure, most
members have had little opportunity to introduce floor amendments.
Even members of the foreign affairs authorizations committees have had
little influence in the process since foreign aid restrictions are often
tagged onto appropriations bills.
As for adherence to conventional committee structures, Congress has
created committees that resemble the proposed legislative-executive com-
mittee. Although it has never established a legislative-executive commit-
tee endowed with the power to report legislation to each House for
consideration, it has created a joint congressional committee with such
reporting powers and a legislative-executive committee with powers lim-
ited to oversight and investigation. For more than thirty years, from
1946 to 1977, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, composed of
members from both Houses, held exclusive congressional power over
atomic energy legislation. 170 Vested with full jurisdiction over atomic
energy legislation, the Atomic Committee enjoyed unusual power as the
only joint legislative committee ever created with the authority to report
legislation.171 The Atomic Committee was abolished in 1977, in part
because of a growing feeling that nuclear energy questions were no longer
168. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
169. The omnibus authorization and appropriations bills permit little time for debate and
consideration of each item. Furthermore, a conference committee to consider foreign assist-
ance provisions in an omnibus bill typically consists of only four people. See supra note 138.
170. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755, 772-73.
171. See 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 660. Since 1947, there have been at least 26 joint congres-
sional committees formed, all with powers limited to investigation and oversight. FIRST STAFF
REPORT TO THE TEMPORARY SELECT COMMITTEEs TO STUDY THE SENATE COMMITTEE
SYSTEM, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE SENATE COMMITTEE SYsTEMS 25 (Comm. Print 1976).
Senator Henry M. Jackson, a long-time committee member, asserted that "the committee
made the decisions, with the advice and consent of the executive branch," instead of the re-
verse, as was commonly the case. 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 660. "The Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy is, in terms of its sustained influence with the Congress, its impact and influ-
ence on the Executive, and its accomplishments, probably the most powerful congressional
committee in the history of the nation." H. GREEN & A. ROSENTHAL, THE JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY: A STUDY IN FUSION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER 288 (1960).
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deserving of the unique attention and secrecy accorded by a joint com-
mittee. 172 Congress has not forgotten this structure, however: in 1984,
the Temporary Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System
recommended establishing another joint committee with the same pow-
ers and structure as the Atomic Committee to govern intelligence
activities. 173
Joint legislative-executive committees have been considered, and in
one case enacted, by Congress. For example, a 1975 survey by the Com-
mission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of For-
eign Policy (the Murphy Commission) found 65% support among
members of Congress for a legislative-executive committee on foreign
policy with informal powers to exchange information, keep track of re-
ports to Congress, and arbitrate differences over security classifica-
tions. 174 In addition, in 1976, Congress created the legislative-executive
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Com-
mission) because of its dissatisfaction with the Executive's monitoring of
human rights after the Helsinki Accords. The Commission, consisting of
twelve congressional members and three executive members, had powers
of oversight and investigation, but did not have the power to report legis-
lation. 175 In sum, the proven record of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and the Helsinki Commission, as well as the serious proposals for
similar joint and legislative-executive committees, demonstrate that the
creation of the proposed committee on foreign assistance would rest on
ample institutional precedent.
3. The Constitutionality of the Legislative-Executive Committee
Participation of executive officers on a congressional committee would
not violate the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. The ex-
ecutive officers would neither become "members" of Congress nor exer-
cise "legislative Powers."
172. A growing number of opponents of nuclear power in the mid 1970s lobbied to repeal
the special status of nuclear energy, primarily to gain access to nuclear power issues at the
subcommittee stage. (The joint committee had no subcommittees.) The Atomic Committee
was also weakened by the retirement or electoral defeat of one-third of its 18 members in the
1976 elections. 1977 CONG. Q. ALM. 660.
173. TEMPORARY SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE SENATE COMMITTEE SYSTEM,
REPORT TOGETHER WITH PROPOSED RESOLUTION, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1314 (Comm. Print
1984).
174. 22 U.S.C. §§ 3002-3003 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In 1985, the Commission expanded
its congressional membership to eighteen. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, Pub. L. No. 99-7, § l(a), 99 Stat. 18 (1985).
175. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSULTATION, supra note 160, at 32. The Murphy
Commission also proposed a joint legislative committee on national security to exercise general
oversight powers and referral powers over reports submitted under the War Powers Resolu-
tion. Id. at 26.
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The Constitution states, "no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a member of either House during his Continuance
in Office." 176 Membership in Congress is strictly defined: a person be-
comes a member only by popular election. 177 Thus, an executive branch
officer who becomes a member of a congressional committee does not by
implication become a member of Congress.
Moreover, an executive officer on a legislative committee does not ex-
ercise legislative power. In Chadha, the Supreme Court defined legisla-
tive actions as those "altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons... outside the Legislative Branch."' 78 The actions of a legisla-
tive committee do not, by themselves, alter the rights or duties of persons
outside of Congress. Committee actions have no binding force even
within Congress; both Houses are free to accept or reject legislation rec-
ommended by a committee.
The committee process is not a constitutionally required component of
legislative decision-making. 179 Therefore, executive branch members
may serve on congressional committees without running afoul of consti-
tutional prohibitions against executive participation in the legislative pro-
cess. In Buckley v.Valeo, 180 the Supreme Court, considering the
constitutionality of a legislative-executive federal elections commission,
noted, "Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially
of an investigative and informative nature, falling in the same general
category as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its
own committees, there can be no question that the Commission presently
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
177. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
year by the People of the several States." Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; "The Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years." Id. amend. XVII, cl. I. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 523 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude
any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership
expressly prescribed in the Constitution." (Emphasis in original.) If the House does not have
authority to exclude from membership a person elected to that body by constitutionally pre-
scribed procedure, it follows that neither can it include those not s6 elected.
178. 462 U.S. at 952.
179. The Constitution does not mention the committee system within its description of the
legislative process; it leaves each House free to regulate its own internal proceedings. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. When it convened for the first time, the House of Representatives had
only one standing committee-the committee on "elections." Similarly, by 1816, the Senate
had only three committees-the committees on "enrolled bills" (1789), on "engrossed bills"
(1806), and on "contingent expenses" (1807). T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 144, at
217-18. Since the committee system has evolved not from a constitutional prescription of leg-
islative process, but from Congress' own internal ordering, a committee vote is not a legislative
act. An action taken under the internal rules of either House does not constitute an exercise of
legislative power.
180. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
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constituted may exercise them."' 81 This case thus supports the notion
that a legislative-executive committee can exercise powers normally dele-
gated to a congressional committee. While it is true that the proposed
legislative-executive committee on foreign assistance would enjoy not
only investigative but also reporting powers, both powers are of the type
that Congress can permissibly delegate to its own committees as part of
its internal rulemaking.
VI. Conclusion
The struggle between the President and Congress over control of for-
eign assistance policy has provoked as much trench warfare over the pro-
cedural weapons of combat as open warfare over substantive policy-
making. This Comment has traced the rise in congressional controls
over executive action in foreign assistance over the last quarter century.
Congress gradually turned from a casual bystander during the "delega-
tion phase" in the 1960s, to an informed spectator during the "investiga-
tion phase" in the 1970s, and to an active participant during the "review
phase" in the 1980s. In restraining executive action, Congress has trod a
fine line between constitutional propriety and practical effectiveness,
choosing controls that genuinely curb executive discretion without in-
truding upon the executive function. The challenge before Congress now
is to streamline its decision-making processes so that it can keep pace
with the Executive's foreign policy initiatives. Congress can prevent
power from slipping through its fingers. It has the tools to do so. It must
choose to use them.
181. Id. at 137. The Federal Election Commission in Buckley consisted of two members
appointed by the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) and four by the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Id. at 113. The Commission
was ruled unconstitutional not because of the participation of executive branch members in the
legislative process, but because of the participation of legislative branch members in adminis-
tration and enforcement functions.
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